译者：会哈气の祥

原文写于11 Jun 2026

Ten years after the Brexit referendum, historian Dr Robert Saunders joins us to discuss why Brexit represented not just a bitter political dispute but a full-blown democratic crisis. We examine why Britain’s institutions struggled to implement the referendum result and why Parliament and the major political parties appear to have learned so little from the experience. And as the Defence Secretary, John Healey, resigns over defence spending, we discuss what this will mean for Sir Keir Starmer’s premiership.

在英国脱欧公投[1]过去十年之际，历史学家罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）博士做客节目，探讨为何脱欧不仅是一场激烈的政治纷争，更演变成了一场全面的民主危机。我们将剖析英国的体制为何难以落实公投结果，以及为何议会和主要政党似乎并未从这一经历中汲取多少教训。此外，针对国防大臣约翰·希利（John Healey）因国防开支问题辞职一事，我们还将讨论这对基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）爵士的首相任期意味着什么。

Dr Robert Saunders

Dr Robert Saunders is Reader in Modern British History and Deputy Director of the Mile End Institute at Queen Mary University of London. His work focuses on political history and the history of ideas, including the history of democracy and democratic thought in Britain, the political and intellectual history of Thatcherism, the relationship between Britain and the European Union, and the role of religion in British political culture. Formerly on Twitter as @redhistorian he now posts on Bluesky as @robertsaunders.bsky.social

罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）博士是伦敦玛丽女王大学（Queen Mary University of London）现代英国史高级讲师（Reader）兼麦尔安德研究所（Mile End Institute）副所长。他的研究领域涵盖政治史与思想史，具体包括英国民主及民主思想史、“撒切尔主义”的政治与思想史、英国与欧盟的关系，以及宗教在英国政治文化中的角色。他此前在 Twitter 上的账号为 @redhistorian，目前在 Bluesky 上的账号为 @robertsaunders.bsky.social。

Transcript

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Intro: [00:00:00] You are listening to Parliament Matters, a Hansard Society production, supported by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Learn more at hansardsociety.org.uk/pm.

Ruth Fox: Welcome to Parliament Matters, the podcast about the institution at the heart of our democracy, Parliament itself. I’m Ruth Fox.

欢迎收听《议会要闻》（Parliament Matters），这是一档聚焦我们民主制度核心机构——议会本身的播客节目。我是露丝·福克斯（Ruth Fox）。

Mark D’Arcy: And I’m Mark D’Arcy. And coming up this week:

我是马克·达西（Mark D’Arcy）。本周节目预告：

Ruth Fox: 10 years on from Brexit, why the vote to leave provoked a full-on democratic crisis in Britain.

脱欧十年后：为何那场脱欧公投在不列颠引发了一场全面的民主危机。

Mark D’Arcy: And all the same forces now at play in current rows about immigration? We talk to historian Dr Robert Saunders.

那么，在当前围绕移民问题的争论中，有哪些力量在起作用？我们采访了历史学家罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）博士。

Ruth Fox: Plus it looked like a quiet week in politics, but then the Defence Secretary resigned. We look at what that means for Sir Keir Starmer’s premiership.

此外，原本看似平静的一周政坛，却因国防大臣的辞职而生变。我们将探讨这对基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）爵士[2]的首相任期意味着什么。

Mark D’Arcy: But first, the 10th anniversary of the Brexit referendum later this month [00:01:00] is bound to provoke an avalanche of reappraisals, but we thought we’d get in first. Historian Dr Robert Saunders, of Queen Mary University of London and friend of the pod, has written an article for the English Historical Review that will be out shortly. It argues that what followed the referendum was far more than the normal political upheaval. We asked him into the studio to tell us more.

首先，本月晚些时候将迎来英国脱欧公投十周年，届时势必会引发一波密集的重新审视与评估，但我们决定抢先一步探讨这一话题。伦敦玛丽女王大学的历史学家、同时也是本节目老朋友的罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）博士，为《英国历史评论》[3]（English Historical Review）撰写了一篇文章，即将发表。他在文中指出，公投之后发生的一切，远非寻常的政治动荡所能概括。我们特意邀请他来到演播室，为我们做进一步的解读。

So, Robert, welcome to the pod again. Now, in your piece, you describe Brexit as not just a crisis within British democracy, but a crisis of British democracy, a crisis of the way the system works, of the assumptions behind the system. What are you getting at there?

那么，罗伯特，欢迎再次莅临本播客。在你的文章中，你将“脱欧”描述为不仅仅是英国民主内部的一场危机，更是一场关乎英国民主制度本身的危机——即涉及该制度运作方式及其背后基本假设的危机。你具体是指什么呢？

Robert Saunders: So democracy is actually quite an explosive idea. Democracy teaches a basic principle that the people should govern, but it doesn’t tell us who the people are or how they should govern, or what kind of areas should be subject to democratic authority. So democracy has within it a tendency to splinter into different sects and denominations. We have parliamentary democracy, [00:02:00] presidential democracy, direct democracy, liberal democracy, industrial democracy, social democracy, Christian democracy, the democracy of the market, and unlike other kind of belief systems, what you can get is a kind of holy war in which different versions of democracy are wrestling against each other. Everyone is worshipping the same democratic gods, but they all see everybody else as some kind of heretic. And Brexit I think is quite an interesting example of that, in that it was very widely believed during the Brexit period by both leavers and remainers alike, that democracy was under attack, whether from remainer elites who were trying to overturn the will of the people, or from populist demagogues who were kind of driving a chainsaw through Britain’s democratic norms and institutions. And so you get judges denounced as enemies of the people. You have MPs castigated as saboteurs who must be crushed. We culminate in the suspension of Parliament. There’s a very palpable sense among MPs that their [00:03:00] personal safety is at threat here. So what people are arguing about in the Brexit crisis isn’t just, should we be in the common market or should we be in the customs union. What they’re arguing about is actually who has the right to take democratic decisions and who can speak for the people. And I think that’s partly what makes it such an explosive political moment.

所以说，民主实际上是一个极具爆发力（explosive）的理念。民主传达了一个基本原则，即人民应当统治（people should govern），但它并未明确界定谁是“人民”、以及他们应如何治理，亦未说明哪些领域应受民主权威管辖。正因如此，民主内部往往会分化出各种不同的“宗派和教派”（sects and denominations）。我们看到了议会民主（parliamentary democracy）[4]、总统制民主（presidential democracy）[5]、直接民主（direct democracy）[6]、自由民主（liberal democracy）[7]、产业民主（industrial democracy）[8]、社会民主（social democracy）[9]、基督教民主（Christian democracy）[10]、市场民主（the democracy of the market）[11]等多种形式；与其他信仰体系不同的是，于是可能形成一种“圣战”（holy war）式的斗争，即各种不同版本的民主理念相互角力、彼此抗衡。每个人崇奉着同样的“民主之神”（democratic gods），却往往视对方为异端。我认为“脱欧”就是一个极具代表性的例子：在脱欧进程中，无论是支持脱欧者还是留欧派，普遍都感到民主正遭受威胁——要么是留欧派精英们（elites）试图推翻民意，要么是民粹主义（populist）煽动者正用“电锯”般粗暴的手段破坏英国的民主规范与制度。于是，法官被斥为“人民之敌”[12]，议员被痛骂为必须予以击垮的“破坏分子”，事态最终演变为议会被迫停摆[13]。议员们深切地感到自身的人身安全受到了威胁。因此，在脱欧危机中，人们争论的焦点不仅仅在于是否留在共同市场或关税同盟内，更在于究竟谁有权做出民主决策，以及谁能真正以人民之名发声（speak for the people）。我认为，这正是导致这一政治时刻充满爆发力的原因之一。

Mark D’Arcy: I remember the day after the Brexit result, dawn, when Nigel Farage appeared on the news bulletin saying this was a victory for the real people of Britain. And that I think almost crystallises what you’re trying to say here, that there’s this whole idea that Parliament and government for years had been going against the settled will of the British people not to go further into Europe, and just trying to slide it past the voters without ever really creating a moment when they could decide for themselves.

我记得英国脱欧公投结果出炉后的那个黎明，奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）出现在新闻节目中，声称这是不列颠“真正的人民”的胜利（a victory for the real people of Britain）。[14]我认为这恰好概括了你想表达的观点：长期以来，议会和政府一直违背英国民众既定的意愿——即不愿在欧洲一体化[15]进程中走得更远——却试图在不给选民真正自主抉择机会的情况下，悄然推进这一进程。

Robert Saunders: Right. I think there’s a really interesting paradox here, which is that a lot of the case for leaving the European Union was couched in terms of restoring parliamentary democracy and restoring parliamentary sovereignty. And yet in many ways the case for having a [00:04:00] referendum in the first place was that Parliament could not be trusted with this decision, that Parliament had over decades, as you say, been defying the will of the people by breaking promises on Europe saying it would have referendums and then not holding them, and that what you needed was an instrument that would take this power out of the hands of Parliament and give it directly to the people. So the referendum was kind of a symptom of a loss of faith in parliamentary government, but it then, of course, amplified and magnified that because the result was that 52% of those voting did indeed back Leave, whereas three quarters of Members of Parliament had backed Remain. So it really exposed what appeared to be a gulf between Britain’s elected representatives and the people they were supposedly representing.

是这样的。我认为这里存在一个非常有趣的悖论：当初支持脱欧的许多论证，都建立在想要恢复议会民主的作用（parliamentary democracy）和恢复议会主权（parliamentary sovereignty）[16]的名义之上。然而，从许多方面来看，当初之所以主张举行公投，正是因为人们认为议会在这一问题上不值得被信任；正如你所言，几十年来，议会屡屡违背关于欧洲问题的承诺——先是声称要举行公投，事后却并未兑现——从而违背了人民的意志（will of the people）。因此，当时需要一种制度安排（instrument），将这项权力从议会手中移出，直接交给人民（the people）。所以说，公投本身既是对议会制政府失去信心的体现，反过来又加剧并放大了这种不信任感；毕竟，最终有52%的投票者支持脱欧，而四分之三的下议院议员（MPs）却支持留欧。这无疑表明英国民选代表与他们所代表的民众（the people）之间似乎存在着巨大的鸿沟（gulf）。

Ruth Fox: And a big problem here is actually the referendum process itself. We are going to an extensive discussion about how we ended up with a referendum involving private members; bills, backbench business committee, we won’t rehearse that, but the way in which the referendum was handled, the fact that it was a sort of binary [00:05:00] choice, do you want to stay in the EU or not, but what not staying in the EU would mean was not explored. That’s the big problem that Parliament then had to essentially try and resolve.

而这里一个很大的问题，实际上就在于公投程序本身。我们本来可以展开大量讨论，去说明我们究竟是如何走到这一步——即一个涉及议员个人提案（private members’ bills）、后座议员事务委员会（Backbench Business Committee）等因素的公投。但我们不打算在这里重复这一过程。关键在于，这场公投的处理方式本身存在问题：它事实上被设计成了一个非此即彼的选择（binary choice）——你是否希望留在欧盟？但是，离开欧盟究竟意味着什么，却并没有得到充分讨论。这正是后来议会不得不试图解决的核心问题。

Robert Saunders: Exactly. It’s a very odd referendum structurally, in that referendums in parliamentary systems are usually what are called confirmatory referendums. So Parliament has decided to do something and then the referendum decides whether that goes ahead or not. So Scottish devolution, for example, you legislate to create a Scottish Parliament and then the public either veto it or allow it to go forward. This was what we might call an abdicatory referendum. Parliament never actually debated the question on which the referendum was fought. It never debated whether Britain should or should not leave the EU. It simply passed that question over, and that creates a really difficult scenario in which there was a mandate for leaving, but there was no mandate on any of the questions that would then follow from that. What should the future relationship look like? Do we want to stay in the [00:06:00] customs union or the single market? How is the border in Northern Ireland going to work? Those questions still had to be answered, but it wasn’t clear who actually had the authority to answer them. Normally the answer would be Parliament, but most MPs had just lost the referendum. Classically, the right of an MP to make decisions comes from the fact that they have won an election in their constituency. Something like two thirds of MPs had in fact lost the referendum in their own constituency. So there was no agreement on what Brexit should look like, and actually no agreement on whether it was the right of Parliament or the executive or the courts or a second referendum or some other mechanism to make those decisions.

确实如此。从结构上看，这是一次非常奇特的公投，因为议会制国家通常举行的公投属于“确认性公投”（confirmatory referendums）[17]。也就是说，议会先决定采取某项行动，然后通过公投来决定是否付诸实施。以苏格兰权力下放为例，议会先立法设立苏格兰议会，随后由公众决定是否决该方案还是允许其推进。而这次公投则属于一种“放弃决策权的公投”（abdicatory referendum）[18]。议会从未真正辩论过此次公投所涉及的核心议题——即英国究竟应不应该脱离欧盟。议会只是将这一问题转交给了公投，从而导致了一种极其棘手的局面：虽然公投结果赋予了“脱欧”的授权，但对于脱欧后随之而来的各种具体问题，却没有任何明确的授权或共识。未来的关系应如何构建？是留在关税同盟还是单一市场？北爱尔兰边境问题该如何解决？这些问题亟待解答，但究竟由谁来拍板却并不明确。按理说应由议会负责，但大多数议员在公投中的立场恰恰是“留欧”一方，即他们实际上输掉了这场公投。议员做决策的权力通常源于他们在各自选区赢得选举的事实；然而，实际上约三分之二的议员在各自选区内的公投结果都是“留欧”派落败。因此，各方对于“脱欧”应以何种形式进行无法达成共识，甚至对于究竟该由议会、行政部门、法院、第二次公投还是其他机制来做出这些决定，也未能达成一致。

Mark D’Arcy: You could imagine a kind of ideal decision-making process where maybe there was an initial referendum on the principle of should we leave the EU, to be followed by a confirmatory referendum on the terms that the UK had then negotiated, something like that. So a two-stage process, so the public could at least theoretically turn around and say, oh, on these terms, I think it’s better to [00:07:00] stay, if they wanted to. You’d then have a much clearer system. But as you say, in this you needed someone to come in and fill the gap and say what Brexit meant. Theresa May, who became Prime Minister after David Cameron very rapidly resigned, famously remarked that Brexit meant Brexit, but no one knew what that meant. So there we were again.

你可以设想一种理想的决策过程：先就“是否应该脱欧”这一原则问题举行初步公投，随后针对英国谈妥的具体脱欧条款举行确认性公投——大致就是这样一种两阶段流程。这样一来，公众至少在理论上可以回过头来表态说：“噢，鉴于这些条款，我觉得还是留在欧盟比较好”——如果他们愿意的话。这样建立的体系会清晰得多。但正如你所言，当时需要有人站出来填补空白，明确界定“脱欧”究竟意味着什么。特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）在戴维·卡梅伦（David Cameron）仓促辞职后接任首相，她曾抛出那句名言：“脱欧就是脱欧”（Brexit means Brexit），但没人知道这具体指什么。于是，我们又回到了原点。[19]

Robert Saunders: Yes, Dominic Cummings, actually before the referendum, had suggested precisely that model, that you might have a second referendum on the terms. And of course the people we’re talking about here are not political philosophers, they are people who are engaging in political warfare. So that was partly done for a strategic reason, so that you could park the issue of what a future Brexit would look like during the course of the campaign. But then that question re-erupts afterwards. And a problem here was that the referendum had given a mandate for leaving, but it hadn’t given a mandate for any version of leaving. And every version of leaving is less popular than leaving in the abstract. Whether you are leaving with Theresa May’s deal or Boris Johnson’s deal or no deal, [00:08:00] or some other kind of arrangement, that is always going to fracture the Leave coalition. So you have a mandate to leave, but not for any of the doors through which you might actually depart.

没错，多米尼克·卡明斯（Dominic Cummings）实际上在公投前就提出过这种模式，即针对具体的脱欧条款举行第二次公投。当然，我们谈论的这些人并非政治哲学家，而是从事政治博弈的实战派。因此，这一提议在一定程度上是出于战略考量，旨在让竞选期间能够暂时搁置“未来脱欧具体形态”这一议题。然而，这个问题随后又重新浮出水面。这里的问题在于，公投虽然赋予了“脱欧”的授权，却并未授权采取某种特定的脱欧方案。事实上，任何具体的脱欧方案都不如抽象意义上的“脱欧”那样受大众欢迎。无论是依据特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）的协议[20]、鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）的协议[21]，还是“无协议脱欧”[22]，亦或是其他形式的安排，这些方案总会导致支持脱欧的阵营发生分裂[23]。简而言之，你虽然获得了脱欧的授权，却并未获得关于具体通过哪种方式实现脱欧的授权。

Mark D’Arcy: And that’s where it gets really complicated, isn’t it? And all the fractiousness of the politics that followed flows from the point that there wasn’t a clear idea of where we went after we crossed the threshold out of the EU. And so you had Theresa May trying to set up her deal. And you got to the bizarre position where MPs who had voted for every Brexit deal Theresa May put on the table were being denounced as people who were blocking Brexit because it wasn’t enough of a Brexit for her critics or those who wanted to ride into Downing Street on the back of discontent with her deal.

这正是问题变得错综复杂之处，不是吗？随之而来的种种政治纷争，其根源都在于：对于跨出欧盟大门后的去向，当时并没有明确的构想。于是，特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）试图敲定她的脱欧协议。结果出现了一种荒谬的局面：那些对特蕾莎·梅提出的每一项脱欧协议都投了赞成票的议员，反倒被指责为阻挠脱欧的人——只因在批评者眼中，或者在那些企图利用人们对协议的不满来入主唐宁街的人看来，这些协议的“脱欧力度”还不够彻底。

Robert Saunders: Yes. I mean, a remarkable thing is that of the, I think, 21 Conservative MPs who were expelled from the party by Boris Johnson and who became a sort of traitor’s gallery of people who tried to block Brexit, I think 17 of them had voted on every occasion for every deal that had ever been put before Parliament.

是的。我想说的是，在鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）将那21名保守党议员逐出党籍——使他们沦为试图阻挠“脱欧”的“叛徒”——之后，人们发现其中17人其实在议会表决各项“脱欧”协议时，每一次都投了赞成票。

Mark D’Arcy: The Rory [00:09:00] Stewarts, the Dominic Grieves, people like that.

罗里·斯图尔特（Rory Stewart）和多米尼克·格里夫（Dominic Grieve）之流，诸如此类。

Robert Saunders: Exactly. That they had voted for Theresa May’s deal three times. They had voted for Boris Johnson’s deal. The only thing they objected to was leaving without a deal. But I think that speaks to what was genuinely a difficult problem here, that the question wasn’t: are you willing to vote for Brexit? In some form it’s: are you willing to enact what we believe to be the will of the people as expressed in the referendum? So you had this almost kind of godly instruction, which the humans down on earth were trying to translate into reality. They were trying to kind of express the will of God. So I talk in the article about this idea of prophetic democracy, the idea that just as in the Old Testament you have prophets coming out of the wilderness, centre in the courts of kings and princes and saying, thus says the Lord. We also had for three years after 2016 a whole series of politicians standing up and saying, thus says the people, that I know what the people want and the people do not want this. And therefore, actually it is possible logically to argue that somebody [00:10:00] who votes for Theresa May’s deal is voting to frustrate the referendum outcome because people didn’t vote for what she was offering.

他们曾三次投票支持特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）达成的协议，也曾投票支持鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）的协议。他们唯一反对的是“无协议脱欧”（leaving without a deal）。但我认为，这正触及了这里一个真正棘手的问题：公投提出的并不是“你是否愿意投票选择脱欧”，而是在某种意义上变成了这样一个问题——“你是否愿意落实我们所认为的、已经通过公投表达出来的人民的意志（will of the people）？”这就好比有一道近乎神圣的旨意，而凡人正试图将其转化为现实；他们试图传达某种“神的意志”（will of God）。因此，我在文章中探讨了“先知式民主”（prophetic democracy）[24]这一概念：正如《旧约》中那些从荒野走来、步入王公贵族宫廷并宣称“主如此说”的先知一样，2016年以后的三年里，我们也看到了一连串政客站出来宣称“人民如此说”——声称自己了解人民的意志，并断言人民并不想要某种特定的方案。正因如此，从逻辑上讲，完全可以说：那些投票支持特蕾莎·梅协议的人，实际上是在阻挠公投结果的落实，因为选民当初投票支持的并非她所提出的那种方案。

Ruth Fox: I think it’s fair to say in that period, Parliament didn’t cover itself in glory. You know, I remember from the despatch box, I think it was the then Attorney General, we had the Prime Minister attacking that Parliament for blocking the will of the people, as they would see it. It got itself into an awful lot of procedural problems and difficulties. So you ended up with the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House of Commons at loggerheads over choices he made. How do you reflect on it now? Because Mark and I, we are scarred. Our memories are scarred by covering these events.

客观来说，在那段时期，议会的表现并不光彩（didn’t cover itself in glory）。你知道，我记得当时——应该是在时任总检察长在despatch box[25]前发表讲话的时候——首相曾批评议会，认为议会阻挠了他们所理解的“民意”（will of the people）。议会陷入了大量程序上的问题和困境。最终，首相和下议院议长因为议长所作出的一些决定而陷入了激烈对立。如今回想起来，你怎么看那段经历？因为我和马克都算是“留下后遗症”了——报道那些事件的经历，直到现在都还让我们记忆犹新。

Mark D’Arcy: Post-traumatic.

创伤后遗症啊。

Ruth Fox: Yes, live on BBC Parliament, that’s where this podcast started, Mark, really, wasn’t it? On BBC Parliament.

对的对的，就是在BBC Parliament[26]频道的直播里面——说真的，马克，这个播客最初就是从那里起步的，对吧？就是在BBC Parliament。

Mark D’Arcy: That was the genesis.

是从那里开始。

Ruth Fox: The Brexit years commentating on the big votes and invariably Theresa May losing them. So how do you reflect on how Parliament performed?

在“脱欧”那几年，你对那些重大表决进行了评述，而特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）总是遭遇失利。所以说，你如何评价议会当时的表现？

Robert Saunders: I think it would be hard to reach any conclusion other than the fact that Parliament fails to handle this question. And I [00:11:00] think remainers and leavers would both think that. I don’t think there’s anybody who feels that they got what they wanted out of that process. And so actually, whether we’re remainers or leavers or somewhere in the middle, we should want to think about why that was the case. Why did our democratic institutions actually come so close to breakdown over this major question? How can we try and make sure this doesn’t actually happen again?

我觉得，最终恐怕只能承认一点：议会没有处理好这个问题。而且，无论是支持留欧的人还是支持脱欧的人，恐怕都会有同感。我不认为有谁会觉得自己在这一过程中如愿以偿。因此，无论我们是支持留欧、支持脱欧，还是持中间立场，都应当思考为何会出现这种情况。为什么我们的民主体制在面对这一重大议题时，竟一度濒临崩溃？我们又该如何努力，确保此类事件不再重演？

I think it’s worth saying perhaps first of all, that Parliament, of course, is not an agency. Parliament doesn’t have a mind. Parliament is an arena in which people argue and fight. So part of the problem here was that it was always easier for party leaders to blame Parliament for the failure to get Brexit through than to say, my own backbenchers[27] are rebelling, or my own party leadership is doing the wrong thing. So Parliament became to some extent a useful whipping boy.

我觉得首先需要说明一点：议会当然不是一个有自己意志的行动者（agency）[28]。议会本身并没有一个统一的意志，它本来就是不同观点相互辩论、碰撞的地方。所以，这里面的一部分问题就在于，对于政党领导人来说，把脱欧没能推进归咎于议会，总比承认“是我自己的后座议员在反我”，或者“是我们党的领导层出了问题”要容易得多。于是，在某种程度上，议会就成了一个很有用的替罪羊。

But I think we also should recognise that Parliament was trying to do something fantastically difficult, and I think probably unprecedented, which is that it was trying to carry through a planetary-sized reform. [00:12:00] Brexit was possibly the biggest activity that the British state has undertaken in peacetime, and it was trying to do that in a hung parliament in which no party actually has an effective majority, and that almost never happens. Normally, governments either have substantial majorities, which mean that they can dominate Parliament, or they recognise that they don’t have a majority, and so they trim their ambitions and they don’t try to carry through very contentious policies. That simply wasn’t an option in this situation. So we had a terrible mismatch between the instruction of the referendum and the delivery system of Parliament. We might have resolved that by working across party, but Britain doesn’t have much of a tradition of working across party. And in Theresa May and Jeremy Corbyn, we had two party leaders who were particularly tribal and particularly averse to working across party lines.

但我们也应认识到，议会当时试图完成一项极度艰难、甚至可以说是史无前例的任务：推动一场影响深远的宏大变革。脱欧（Brexit）堪称英国政府在和平时期所开展的规模最大的行动，而议会却是在“悬浮议会”（hung parliament）[29]——也就是说没有任何政党拥有绝对多数席位——的状态下试图推进这一进程；这种情况在历史上极为罕见。通常情况下，政府要么拥有稳固的多数席位从而主导议会，要么意识到自己缺乏多数优势而收敛雄心，避免强行推行极具争议的政策。但在当时的情况下，这些常规选项根本行不通。于是，公投所传达的民意与议会这一执行机制之间出现了严重的错位。我们本可以通过跨党派合作来解决这一难题，但英国政坛向来缺乏跨党派合作的传统。而且，当时的两位党魁——特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）和杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）——都带有强烈的党派本位色彩（tribal）[30]，且极度排斥跨党派协作。

Mark D’Arcy: I suppose the other factor here is that the party lines themselves were pretty badly scrambled. You had the Brexit vote cutting across party lines, so you had staunch Remainers in heavily Leave constituencies wondering [00:13:00] what on earth to do. You had people who were very Remain in Remain constituencies finding they were defying their party line if they were Conservatives. You had all sorts of complications like that, which just made the whipping[31] aspect of this trying to get a government majority together an absolute nightmare. And in retrospect, it’s almost surprising to me that party royalties[32] held as much as they did under the circumstances.

我想，另一个因素在于当时的党派立场界限变得相当模糊混乱。脱欧公投跨越了既有的党派界限，导致身处“脱欧派”占绝对优势选区的坚定“留欧派”选民陷入了不知所措的境地；而在“留欧派”占优选区，那些支持留欧的保守党人若坚持己见，便意味着违背了党派立场。诸如此类的复杂情况层出不穷，使得政府在试图通过党鞭机制（即党内纪律约束）来确保议会多数支持时，面临着一场彻头彻尾的噩梦。事后看来，最让我惊讶的反而是，在那样的环境下，党员对自己政党的忠诚居然还保持了这么强的约束力。

Robert Saunders: I think that’s right. And of course there were very few people in Parliament actually after 2016 whose primary interest was Brexit or the European Union. This is a Parliament that is full of people who have mostly come into Parliament to do and to talk about other things, and they still care about those things. So Brexit is one element of a much larger kind of political kaleidoscope. You have for much of this period a civil war going on inside the Labour Party over the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn. His own backbenchers had tried to replace him and he had then been reinserted by the party membership. So there’s a big battle over the future of the Labour Party going on. There’s also, from very early on, a succession [00:14:00] struggle going on in the Conservative Party. It’s pretty obvious from the 2017 election onwards that Theresa May is not long for this political world and that somebody else is going to replace her, and this is probably going to be Boris Johnson. So MPs are having to make all sorts of different calculations. What is this going to mean for the leadership of the party? What’s this going to mean for our ability to reunite the party after Brexit has done? What’s it going to mean for our ability not just to win an election, but to win the voters that we feel we ought to be winning? Because parties usually have a sense of who their proper voters are. So it matters to the Labour Party that they’re still winning their traditional industrial heartlands in the north. It matters to some Conservative MPs that they’re still winning in Middle England. So all of this is swirling around and complicating the situation.

我认为确实如此。当然，2016年之后，议会中真正将“脱欧”或欧盟事务视为首要关注点的人寥寥无几。议会里的大多数议员当初进入议会是为了处理或讨论其他议题，并且至今仍关心这些议题。因此，“脱欧”只是更宏大、更多元的政治图景中的一个组成部分。在此期间的大部分时间里，工党内部因杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）的领导权问题而爆发了激烈的内斗。他的工党后座议员曾试图把他赶下台，但随后他又得到了工党党员的支持，重新坐稳了党魁的位置。[33]由此可见，工党内部正围绕其未来走向展开一场重大博弈。与此同时，保守党内部也早早开始了关于接班人的权力争夺。自2017年大选以来，局势已相当明朗：特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）的政治生涯已进入倒计时，必将有人接替她的位置，而这个人很可能就是鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）。[34]因此，议员们不得不进行各种各样的权衡与考量：这对党的领导权意味着什么？这对“脱欧”尘埃落定后党内重获团结的能力有何影响？这不仅关乎能否赢得选举，更关乎能否赢得那些我们认为理应支持我们的选民——毕竟，政党通常对自己“应有”的选民群体有着明确的认知。例如，工党非常看重能否保住北部传统的工业腹地；而对一些保守党议员来说，能否在“英格兰中部地区”（Middle England）赢得选票也至关重要。所有这些因素交织在一起，使局势变得错综复杂。

Mark D’Arcy: And it’s particularly striking actually as of the last election, the extent to which the Conservatives lost a large chunk of Middle England, seats in Sussex, seats in Surrey, seats in Hampshire, going to other parties in a way that was quite unimaginable really not all that long ago. Blue-chip seats.[35] It’s quite clear that the [00:15:00] Conservatives have lost a large chunk of their base, at least partly over Brexit.

而且，从上一次大选的结果来看，一个非常引人注目的变化是：保守党失去了相当一部分“中部英格兰”的支持——比如萨塞克斯、萨里、汉普郡的一些选区，纷纷转向了其他政党。这种变化在不久以前几乎是难以想象的。这些可都是曾经稳操胜券的“蓝筹”选区。显而易见，保守党流失了很大一部分支持者基础，而这至少在一定程度上也是因为“脱欧”的问题。

Robert Saunders: Yes. I think another thing that makes Brexit very difficult is that to some extent it’s simply a kind of an accelerant of things that are already happening inside British politics, inside the party system. So we can look at voting patterns over a long period of time and see that attachment to the big two parties had been declining. I think in 1951 something like 97% of voters who go to the polls vote either Labour or Conservative. By 2010, that’s down to about 60%. If you include non-electors, actually the share of the total electorate that goes out and votes Labour or Conservative halves over that period. So we’ve got weakening party loyalties, and then Brexit drops a bomb on that. To an extent, it gives voters permission to break and to change their party alliances, and we’re living in that much more fractured moment now. But there is an attempt in 2016-17 to kind of build new party bases. The Conservative party, to some extent, makes a conscious decision it’s going to [00:16:00] rebuild its base on the Leave votes. The Labour Party takes longer to decide that it’s going to rebuild itself on the Remain vote, but it’s kind of moving in that direction. So the parties are trying to carry this through, are kind of going round and round in the tumble dryer at the time.

是的。我认为导致“脱欧”问题变得如此棘手的另一个因素在于，在某种程度上，它起到了催化剂的作用，加速了英国政坛及政党体系内部早已在发生的变化。如果我们审视长期的投票模式，就会发现选民对两大主要政党的忠诚度一直在下降。1951年时，约97%的投票选民支持工党或保守党；而到了2010年，这一比例已降至约60%。如果将未投票者也计算在内，那么在这一时期，在全体选民中支持工党或保守党的比例实际上缩减了一半。可见，对这些政党忠诚本已式微，而“脱欧”事件的爆发更是给这一局面投下了一枚重磅炸弹。在某种程度上，它给了选民打破原有党派归属、转而支持其他政党的契机，我们如今正处于一个更加分裂的时期。不过，在2016至2017年间，各方也曾试图构建新的政党支持基础。保守党在一定程度上做出了明确决策，即基于“脱欧派”选民来重建其支持基础；工党虽然在决定基于“留欧派”选民重建自身方面耗时较长，但也正朝着这个方向发展。因此，各政党都在努力应对这一局面，当时的情形就像是在滚筒式烘干机里一样，处于一种剧烈动荡、反复翻腾的状态。

Mark D’Arcy: Yes. And you end up with Conservative MPs in places like Sedgefield, Tony Blair’s old seat, after the 2019 election. So the Conservative MPs in some very improbable places. Was this an anomaly? Was this something that would kind of unravel very rapidly or was this the new dispensation of politics?

结果，在2019年大选之后，像塞奇菲尔德（Sedgefield）——即托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）曾经的选区——也出现了保守党议员。也就是说，保守党议员出现在了一些极不寻常的地方。这究竟是一个反常现象？是会迅速瓦解的昙花一现，还是标志着政治新格局的到来？

Robert Saunders: Yes. One of the oddities about the 2017 election is in lots of ways it looked like an election that had rebuilt the two party system. Suddenly actually by and large the Leave vote coalesced around the Conservatives. The Remain vote was a little bit more splintered, but broadly around the Labour Party. And the paradox of that election actually is that it was nominally a Brexit election that was barely about Brexit at all. Because actually neither party disagreed on the principle. They both went to the poll saying, we will do Brexit. Neither of them said how they would do it. I think [00:17:00] Labour promised a Brexit for jobs. The Conservative party was advertising a red, white and blue Brexit. And oddly, that didn’t give voters a great deal to work on, but it did look for a period as if the two party system was now back, and that Brexit, in a funny way, might actually have created a new kind of polarity in British politics.

2017年大选一个很奇特的地方在于，从很多方面看，它似乎重新塑造了英国的两党格局（two party system）。实际上，脱欧选票很大程度上汇聚到了保守党一边；留欧选票虽然更加分散，但总体上仍主要集中在工党周围。而这场选举的悖论在于：它名义上是一场“脱欧大选”，但实际上几乎没有真正围绕脱欧展开。因为两大政党在原则问题上并没有分歧——它们都向选民承诺，会实现脱欧；但双方都没有明确说明具体要如何脱欧。我认为，工党提出的是一种“以就业为中心的脱欧”(Brexit for jobs)[36]，而保守党宣传的则是一种“红白蓝的脱欧”（a red, white and blue Brexit）[37]。奇怪的是，这样的表述其实并没有给选民太多可以权衡的依据。但在当时一段时间里，看起来两党格局似乎重新回来了，而脱欧以一种颇为意外的方式，似乎正在英国政治中创造一种新的两极竞争格局。

Ruth Fox: But that hasn’t really happened.

但后来事实并没有朝这个方向发展。

Robert Saunders: No.

并非。

Ruth Fox: The Red Wall collapsed pretty soon. You say in the article, Brexit was a symptom, not just a cause of Britain’s democratic discontent. One side of the debate wanting a buccaneering free trade nation at a time when, not long after, that concept, with the advent of the Trump administration, falls apart, really.

“红墙”选区（The Red Wall）[38]很快就崩塌了。正如你在文章中所言，英国脱欧既是英国民众对民主现状不满的体现，也是这种不满的成因之一。辩论的一方曾渴望将英国打造为一个敢于开拓、奉行自由贸易的国家，然而就在不久之后——随着特朗普政府（Trump administration）的上台——这一构想实际上便宣告破灭了。

Robert Saunders: Yes. So I suppose there’s sort of two parts to that. I mean, firstly about the sense that this is a symptom rather than a cause. Almost any indicator that we look at suggests a declining faith in Parliament in the 20 years before the referendum, whether that’s turnout or just polls of trust in Parliament, to the list of problems that you laid out. We [00:18:00] could add things like the expenses scandal, which clearly does huge harm to the reputation of MPs. And the 2010 Conservative manifesto is a very serious document, which is called an invitation to join the government of Britain. And actually the whole theme of that manifesto is about the need for democratic renewal. But what’s really striking about it is that almost everything it proposes involves taking powers away from Parliament and giving them to someone else. Often through kind of locally elected bodies like elected police commissioners. It promises to cut the number of Members of Parliament. It promises to cut the cost of Parliament. So actually there’s already a sense here that the way in which you renew democracy is that you push Parliament out of the way. One of the first things that government then does in office is to pass a referendum lock, which is to legislate to say that Parliament cannot pass new powers to the European Union without the consent of the people. And it’s such a telling moment, I think, because conventionally the people give their consent to legislation through Parliament. Now [00:19:00] Parliament is having to ask the public in a referendum whether it’s allowed to do this. So we’ve already got a kind of intellectual world in which Parliament has itself kind of accepted that it does not have legitimacy on decisions relating to Europe. And then on the second part about buccaneering, I think that it is really important that we’re all, to some extent, formed politically in the time in which we first kind of emerge and become politically conscious, and a lot of leading Eurosceptics were very forged in the 1990s. That’s the kind of political world that shapes a lot of the thinking of the key players in the story. And the 90s is the decade in which it looks like geopolitics has been suspended.

是的。我想这可以分两个方面来看。首先，关键在于：这其实是一种症状，而不是原因。无论我们观察什么指标——无论是投票率，还是公众对议会信任度的调查——几乎都显示，在脱欧公投之前的二十年里，人们对议会的信心一直在下降。再加上你刚才提到的那些问题，我们还可以补充议员开支丑闻之类的事件，它们显然严重损害了议员群体的声誉。2010年的保守党纲领是一份非常重要的文件，标题叫作《一封加入英国治理的邀请信》（an invitation to join the government of Britain）[39]。而这份纲领的核心主题，其实就是民主更新的必要性。但真正令人瞩目的是，它提出的几乎所有改革措施，实际上都意味着把权力从议会手中拿走，交给其他主体。很多时候，是交给地方层面的民选机构，比如民选警察专员制度。它承诺减少议员人数，降低议会运行成本。所以，当时已经出现了一种观念：更新民主的方式，就是让议会退到一边。政府上台后采取的首批行动之一，就是推动所谓的“公投锁”（referendum lock）[40]——也就是通过立法规定，如果要进一步赋予欧盟新的权力，议会必须先获得公众同意。我认为，这是一个非常具有象征意义的时刻。因为按照传统，人民是通过议会来表达对法律的同意的；而现在，议会却需要通过公投向公众询问，自己是否有权采取这样的行动。因此，我们已经可以看到一种思想环境正在形成：议会自身似乎也承认，在涉及欧洲事务的问题上，它不再拥有足够的正当性（legitimacy）。至于你提到的第二个方面——那种“海盗式”的冒险精神（buccaneering）[41]——我认为很重要的一点是，我们往往会被自己最初形成政治意识的那个时代塑造。许多主流的疑欧派（Eurosceptics）[42]人士，都是在20世纪90年代形成政治观念的。那个时代的政治环境，深刻影响了这个故事中许多关键人物的思考方式。而20世纪90年代，正是一个看起来地缘政治暂时退场的年代。

Mark D’Arcy: The rules-based international order.

（那时人们相信）国际社会以规则作为基础。

Robert Saunders: Exactly. That we’ve got a kind of free trading system, a Washington consensus that’s underpinned by the United States in which actually tariffs are a thing of the past, trade blocs are a thing of the past, geography has to some extent been abolished, and that you just need kind of nimble actors that can operate in this new kind of world. Now, the world in which we live today [00:20:00] looks radically, fundamentally different to that. We have a President in the United States whose strongest political conviction is his faith in tariffs. We’ve had tariff wars between China and the United States. In lots of ways it looks again a little bit more like the world in the 1970s. Brexit, in retrospect it turns out, happens on the kind of hinge between those two worlds in which it’s still plausible to make an argument about a buccaneering small island but in which actually the geopolitics were about to become very unreceptive to that.

正是如此。过去我们拥有一种由美国支撑的自由贸易体系——即所谓的“华盛顿共识”（Washington consensus）[43]——在这种体系下，关税和贸易集团已成往事，地理距离的制约在某种程度上已被消除，企业只需具备灵活应变的能力，便能在这个新世界中运作。然而，我们今天所处的世界与那时截然不同，有着本质上的差异。美国现任总统最坚定的政治信念之一就是推崇关税；中美之间也爆发了关税战。从许多方面来看，当今世界似乎又有些像20世纪70年代的样子。回过头看，英国“脱欧”恰好发生在连接这两个世界的转折点上：当时，人们或许还能以此为由，构想出一个敢闯敢拼的“小岛国”形象，但实际上，当时的地缘政治环境已变得极不利于这种愿景的实现。

Mark D’Arcy: And so where does that leave us? Because we’ve now got a situation where Parliament isn’t perceived as a legitimate actor and we’ve still got unresolved – I don’t think you call them details – unresolved aspects of Brexit that have to be cleared up. In the relationship with the European Union, we’ve got an EU reset programme coming down the tracks from this government at some point theoretically. So we are kind of still in limbo trying to deal with the consequences of a decision we took without really taking it in [00:21:00] 2016.

那么，我们现在的处境如何呢？一方面，议会不再被视为一个具有正当性（legitimate）的决策主体（actor）；另一方面，关于“脱欧”仍有一些悬而未决的问题——我不认为仅仅称之为“细节”合适，因为它们是必须解决的关键事项。至于与欧盟的关系，理论上，现任政府未来终将启动一项旨在重塑双边关系的计划。因此，我们仍处于一种悬而未决的状态，试图应对我们在2016年做出的那个决定所带来的后果——尽管当时我们并未真正完全领会其深意。

Robert Saunders: Yes, Brexit was always for good or ill going to be a long-term process. The cliche was always, it was a process, not an event. And that was absolutely right. And that’s not about Remainers frustrating things in some ways. One of the strongest arguments for doing Brexit actually was the extent to which membership of the European Union had extended itself into almost every area of national and public life. And that this was going to affect not just the terms of trade, but things like airline safety, international security, how you police your borders. That was always going to continue for a very long time. I think it’s interesting that whenever the debate about rejoining comes up, there’s a kind of allergic reaction, I think, among Members of Parliament and people who are active in those debates about the idea that we might do this again.

是啊，无论结果是好是坏，脱欧注定是一个长期的过程。人们常说“脱欧是一个过程，而非单一事件”，这话确实一点也没错。这并非仅仅是因为留欧派​​在某些方面制造了阻碍。事实上，支持脱欧的一个有力论据在于，欧盟成员国身份的影响已渗透到国家与公共生活的几乎每一个角落。这种影响不仅涉及贸易条款，还涵盖航空安全、国际安全以及边境管控等诸多方面。因此，脱欧带来的影响必然会持续很长一段时间。值得玩味的是，每当讨论起重新加入欧盟的话题时，议会议员以及那些积极参与此类辩论的人士，往往会对“再次加入”这一想法表现出一种近乎过敏般的排斥反应。

Mark D’Arcy: Yes, I mean, it does seem to be the subject that dare not speak its name now. I think the entire political class just winces at the thought of even going there again.

对的，这似乎成了一个“不可言说”的话题。我觉得整个政界一想到要重提此事，就会感到避之唯恐不及。

Robert Saunders: Absolutely. And I think in lots of ways, for good reasons, it was personally deeply unpleasant for almost everybody involved. [00:22:00] And I’m always conscious as a historian, there’s a danger that we can kind of suck the emotion out of events. That you go back to the text, you construct the arguments, you put everything in order, and what you lose actually is that sense of utter confusion and utter misery that was gripping a lot of MPs, particularly in the summer of 2019. And whether you are a Leaver or a Remainer, it was a really dark period for our political institutions. It was a period when it did seem like Parliament might actually collapse. So I don’t think it’s surprising that Members of Parliament, ministers, people who were part of that debate are not keen to reopen that particular box.

确实如此。而且我认为，从很多方面来看——且不无道理——对于几乎所有身处其中的人来说，那段经历在个人层面上都极其令人不快。作为一名历史学家，我始终意识到存在一种风险：我们可能会抽离事件中的情感成分。当你回溯史料、构建论点、梳理脉络时，往往会丢失那种当时笼罩着许多议员——尤其是在2019年夏季——的极度迷茫与痛苦感。无论你是支持“脱欧”还是“留欧”，那对我们的政治体制而言都是一段极其黑暗的时期；当时甚至让人觉得议会真的可能会陷入崩溃。因此，对于那些曾参与这场辩论的议员、大臣及相关人士来说，他们不愿重提这段往事，也就不足为奇了。

Ruth Fox: Well, on that note, Mark, I think we should take a short break and come back and resume in a few minutes. But listeners, while you have that break, remember to rate and review the podcast. It really helps us to grow our audience and ensure that more people can hear from Robert and Mark and myself. So hit follow on your podcast app and rate and review it. Thank you.

说到这里，Mark，我想我们应该休息一下，几分钟后再回来继续。不过，各位听众，在休息期间，请记得给我们的播客评分并留下评论。这真的能帮助我们扩大听众群，让更多人听到 Robert、Mark 和我的分享。所以，请在您的播客应用上点击关注，并进行评分和评论。谢谢各位。

Mark D’Arcy: And we’re back. And Robert, the best part of 10 years has now [00:23:00] elapsed since the referendum vote. And maybe memories of all the drama or the soap opera…

我们继续。Robert，自那场公投以来，差不多已经过去十年了。也许，当年所有那些风波、那些如同政治肥皂剧一般的连续剧式闹剧，如今已经渐渐成为过去……

Ruth Fox: WestEnders, Mark.

WestEnders, Mark.[44]

Mark D’Arcy: …whatever you want to call it, have perhaps now begun to fade. Maybe it’s just that the pot isn’t simmering as hard. So where’s the reputation of Parliament now? Has Parliament indeed improved itself on the back of its experiences during the Brexit wars?

……无论你怎么叫它，那种态势或许已开始消退。也许只是因为局势不再像过去那样沸腾激荡了。那么如今议会的声望还剩下多少呢？那么，经历了脱欧之战的种种磨砺之后，议会是否真的有所长进呢？

Robert Saunders: I think if one of the hopes of Brexit was that it would restore trust in parliamentary democracy, I think it would be very difficult to say that that’s been a success. Levels of faith in politics remain extraordinarily low. Hostility to and contempt for professional politicians I think is dangerously high. It’s not clear that scrutiny of legislation has improved or that Parliament has tackled some of the kind of technical challenges that emerged during Brexit. Two straws in the winds that might be worth thinking about here. One is that unquestionably the main opposition party in British politics in the sense that the party that everybody talks about all the time outside the government and expects to be the main challenger at [00:24:00] the next general election, Reform UK, has almost no parliamentary representation. It is for the first time an extra-parliamentary party, five MPs at the moment. And to some extent, Farage’s parties have always seen democracy as something that happens outside Parliament because the electoral system has done a very good job of locking them out. So a big part of our national politics now happens outside Parliament. Secondly, we might later this year be looking at an election for a new Prime Minister and that election too, if Keir Starmer chooses to contest it, will happen outside Parliament. Keir Starmer would automatically be on the ballot for a Labour leadership contest. And that means for the first time ever, Labour Party members would be deciding whether to remove or reinstate a Prime Minister. And I think that’s again another quite interesting straw actually, that shows us how the place of Parliament and British politics is declining.

如果说“脱欧”的初衷之一是重塑人们对议会民主的信心，那么很难说这一目标已经实现。公众对政治的信任度依然极低，而针对职业政客的敌意与蔑视情绪也高涨到了危险的程度。立法审查工作并未见明显改善，议会也未能有效应对“脱欧”过程中涌现出的诸多技术性难题。这里有两个值得深思的现象：首先，在英国政坛，那个在政府之外备受瞩目、且被视为下一届大选中主要挑战者的政党——“英国改革党”（Reform UK）[45]——在议会中几乎没有代表席位。它实际上是一个议会外的政党（目前仅有五名议员）。某种程度上，法拉奇（Farage）领导的政党一直将民主视为一种发生在议会之外的活动，因为现行选举制度有效地将他们拒之门外。因此，如今我们国家政治生活的一个重要部分是在议会之外进行的。其次，今年晚些时候我们可能会迎来一场新首相的选举；如果基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）决定参选，这场选举同样将在议会之外进行。斯塔默将自动进入工党党魁竞选的候选人名单，这意味着工党党员将有史以来第一次决定是罢免还是留任一位现任首相。我认为，这也是一个相当有趣的现象，它反映出议会在英国政治中的地位正在不断衰落。

Ruth Fox: And you think the very principle of members of a political party in effect being able to choose the leader and therefore the [00:25:00] Prime Minister is problematic. But a scenario in which the incumbent Prime Minister decides he’s going to run in a contest creates all sorts of potential difficulties. Is it that actually the principle of party members deciding is something that you’re concerned about?

您认为，政党成员实际上能够选出党魁、进而决定谁出任首相，这一原则本身存在问题。但如果现任首相决定参与竞选，又会引发各种潜在的难题。你真正关心的是党员决策的原则本身吗？

Robert Saunders: It is. I mean, I’ve been making this argument for a long time. I think with all sorts of good intentions we’ve accidentally done something that is quite anti-democratic, in that we have given the choice over who becomes Prime Minister to a group of people who nobody has elected and nobody can hold to account. I’m not one of those people who says that party members are mad or bad or anything like that. I think party members by and large are public-spirited people who give up their money and their time to try to make politics better. But nobody has elected them to decide who the Prime Minister should be. We don’t let them vote on laws. We don’t let them vote on taxes. It seems very odd to me that we do let them vote on who the leadership in a parliamentary democracy should be. But I think there is a special problem coming down the line here in that, under Labour’s rules, it would be entirely possible for a Prime Minister who has [00:26:00] lost the confidence of Parliament, who in a sense cannot govern any more, to be restored to that position by the Labour Party membership. Or indeed a Prime Minister who clearly still maintains the confidence of Parliament but faces a challenger who can muster 81 MPs, that person could then be removed from the leadership by people outside Parliament. And I think that is a big problem.

是这样。我持这种观点已经很久了。我认为，尽管初衷是好的，但我们在无意中做了一件相当违背民主原则的事：我们将决定谁出任首相的权力，交给了这样一群人——他们既未经选举产生，也无需向任何人负责。我绝非那种认为党内成员“疯狂”（mad）或“品行不端”（bad）的人；相反，我认为绝大多数党内成员都具有公共精神（public-spirited），他们自愿投入金钱与时间，致力于改善公共事务（politics）。然而，并没有人授权他们决定谁该担任首相。我们不让他们表决法律，也不让他们表决税收政策；但在议会制民主体制下，却允许他们投票决定领导人选，这在我看来非常奇怪。更重要的是，我认为这里潜藏着一个特殊的问题：根据工党的规则，完全可能出现这样一种情况——某位首相已失去议会信任（从某种意义上说已无法继续执政），却又被工党党员重新推上这一职位；又或者，某位首相明明仍获议会信任，却因面临一位能集结81名议员支持的挑战者，而被议会体制外的人员罢免了领导职务。我认为这是一个严重的问题。

Mark D’Arcy: It takes us into very interesting territory indeed. All sorts of issues there. And maybe we’ll return to it a bit later on in the pod. But at the same time, we’ve also got an evolving relationship with the EU going on where the government is trying to reset the relationships that were one of the big issues in the Brexit vote in the first place. And that’s all rather taking place below the radar.

这确实把我们带入了一个非常有趣的领域，其中涉及各种各样的问题。也许稍后在节目中我们会回过头来探讨这一点。与此同时，我们与欧盟的关系也在发生变化：政府正试图重塑双方关系——而当初“脱欧”公投时，这正是核心议题之一。而且，这一切都在相对低调、不那么引人注目的情况下进行着。

Ruth Fox: Well, not if you were listening to the House of Lords European Relations Committee this week, Mark.

Emmm…马克，如果你听了本周上议院欧洲关系委员会的会议，就不会这么想了。

Mark D’Arcy: As all of us do. As all of us do.[46]

那当然，我们大家可都是忠实听众嘛。（笑）

Ruth Fox: Yes. So that’s where I and my colleague, researcher Matthew England, regular appearance on this podcast, Matthew and I were giving evidence on the reset or the implications of the reset, which is dynamic alignment with EU rules in [00:27:00] certain areas.

是的。我和我的同事——研究员马修·英格兰（Matthew England，他也是本播客的常客）——正是就这一“重置”及其影响提供了证词；所谓“重置”，指的是在特定领域与欧盟规则保持动态一致。

Mark D’Arcy: Which we were talking about in a recent pod.

我们最近在一期播客中谈到了这一点。

Ruth Fox: Yes, with Professor Catherine Barnard from Cambridge University. And that is one of my worries, and it came through quite strongly in the evidence session. Interestingly, in that session, we had the former head of the referendum campaign Matthew Elliott, Lord Elliott, and then Tim Barrow, Lord Barrow, who was one of our EU negotiators. So it was a very interesting committee to appear before, but below the radar, the government refuses, in its words, to give a running commentary on its negotiations. So we were expecting a European partnership bill in the King’s Speech to be laid before Parliament fairly soon after. That hasn’t happened. We assume possibly further delays because of the situation the government finds itself in now politically. But as and when a deal emerges how Parliament is going to scrutinise it and hold the government to account is going to be incredibly difficult because, despite the last 10 years and the experience, there hasn’t really been any significant reform of how Parliament scrutinises these matters. Whether it’s treaties, whether it’s legislation, [00:28:00] statutory instruments. And it’s incredibly frustrating. And I think MPs are just missing a trick.

是的，是与剑桥大学的凯瑟琳·巴纳德（Catherine Barnard）教授一起。这也是我担忧的问题之一，而且在听证会上这一点表现得尤为明显。有趣的是，那次听证会的出席者包括前公投竞选负责人马修·埃利奥特（Matthew Elliott，即埃利奥特勋爵）以及曾任欧盟事务谈判代表的蒂姆·巴罗（Tim Barrow，即巴罗勋爵）。能在这样一个委员会面前作证非常有意思，但与此同时，政府却拒绝——用他们的话说——对谈判进程进行“实时评论”（running commentary）。我们原本预期在“国王演讲”（King’s Speech）之后不久，议会就会收到一份关于“欧洲伙伴关系”的法案，但这并没有发生。我们推测，鉴于政府目前的政治处境，可能会出现进一步的延误。然而，一旦最终达成协议，议会将如何对其进行审查并追究政府责任，将是一个极大的难题；因为尽管经历了过去十年的种种情况，议会审查此类事务的机制实际上并未发生任何重大改革——无论是针对条约、立法，还是针对法定文书（statutory instruments）[47]。这种情况令人倍感沮丧，我认为议员们错失了一个良机。

Robert Saunders: Yes, I think we have the same broad culture in place that we had during the Brexit years, which is the executive by and large would prefer that Parliament wasn’t involved. The executive doesn’t really like MPs getting involved in policy-making. It feels that’s rather above their station. It’s much easier if you can keep these things contained inside Number 10. And that’s clearly still the mindset that we have now. But I think there’s maybe also a kind of wider institutional problem, which is one of the stronger arguments I think for leaving the EU, was that it was very difficult to have any kind of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of European law. You were taking quite large sections of particularly economic policy-making and you were really lifting them beyond the scrutiny of Parliament. What we’re discovering now though, actually, is it’s not very clear that you get better scrutiny of those things outside the EU. And one of the absences in 2016 was a kind of counterargument from the Remain camp that said there is actually a democratic [00:29:00] case for staying in the European Community as well as a democratic case for leaving. And that democratic case is that in a complicated globalised world in which rules are broadly set across national boundaries, it is important to be inside the clubs that are making the rules. And your Parliament will not have full control over those things, but you will be in the room when they are being drawn up. You will in a sense be pooling your sovereignty with other countries, and you’ll take part in democratic decision-making in that way. That argument was actually made in the 1975 referendum. It was entirely absent in the 2016 campaign. And to some extent, we are experiencing now that problem of you may have got your kind of formal scrutiny powers back, but first, if your own executive don’t like it, they’re not going to matter very much, and secondly, if you’re not in the room where the rules are being made, you are just going to have to accept or reject them.

是的，我认为我们依然延续着“脱欧”时期的那种普遍文化：行政部门（executive）大体上更希望议会不要介入。行政部门并不乐见议员参与政策制定，觉得这似乎有些越俎代庖。如果能把这些事务局限在唐宁街10号内部处理，显然会轻松得多；这种心态至今依然存在。不过，我认为这背后或许还存在更深层的制度性问题。当初支持“脱欧”的一个有力论点是：针对欧盟法律进行实质性的议会审查非常困难。当时，很大一部分政策制定权（尤其是经济政策）实际上被置于了议会审查的范围之外。然而，我们现在的发现是：脱离欧盟后，这些事务是否真的得到了更好的审查，其实并不明确。回看2016年，“留欧”阵营当时缺失了一种反驳论点，即留在欧盟既有民主层面的理由，脱离欧盟也有民主层面的理由。支持留欧的民主理由在于：在一个规则往往跨越国界制定的复杂全球化世界中，身处制定规则的“俱乐部”（clubs）内部至关重要。虽然本国议会无法完全掌控这些事务，但至少能在规则制定过程中在场参与。从某种意义上说，这是与其他国家“共享主权”（pooling your sovereignty with other countries），并以此参与民主决策。这一论点曾在1975年的公投中被提出，但在2016年的公投运动中却完全缺席。在某种程度上，我们现在正经历着这一问题：即便你收回了形式上的审查权，但首先，如果本国行政部门不乐意，这些权力也起不了多大作用；其次，如果你不在制定规则的现场，最终就只能面临“全盘接受”或“断然拒绝”的局面。

Mark D’Arcy: So if we get to the position where the government is once again waving-through EU legislation into British law without much scrutiny, if any at all, are we then [00:30:00] rubbing new salt into old wounds and reviving all the things that were such an issue during the Brexit campaign? Are we getting back to bold bad habits?

那么，如果政府再次在几乎不加审查（甚至完全不加审查）的情况下，直接将欧盟法规纳入英国法律，我们是否是在旧伤口上撒盐，并重燃那些曾在“脱欧”运动期间引发巨大争议的问题？我们是否正在重蹈覆辙，故态复萌（getting back to bold bad habits）？

Robert Saunders: I think we’re certainly reopening an old problem. Whether it has the same kind of political power right now I’m a little bit sceptical of because of course most voters, most of us, don’t actually know what’s in these regulations. It’s not the stuff of everyday politics. One of the things that made the democratic issue so explosive in 2016 was that it had an obvious hook, that it became about immigration. And you know, there’s lots of writing that argues about was the main cause of the Leave vote sovereignty or was it immigration? And I’ve always thought that’s really a kind of false dichotomy because essentially the two became the same thing.

我认为我们无疑是在重提一个旧问题。至于它在当下是否仍具备同样的政治影响力，我持怀疑态度，因为大多数选民——包括我们大多数人——其实并不了解这些法规的具体内容。这并非日常政治关注的焦点。2016年，“民主”议题之所以引发强烈反响，一个关键原因在于它有一个显而易见的切入点（hook）[48]，即与移民问题挂钩。关于当时支持“脱欧”的主因究竟是主权诉求还是移民问题，各界众说纷纭；但我一直认为，这种二分法其实是个伪命题，因为从本质上讲，这两者已然合二为一。

Mark D’Arcy: Sovereignty over immigration.

主权问题高于移民问题

Robert Saunders: Exactly. The slogan take back control was so brilliant because it made a democratic argument, but it attached it to material things. Take back control of your borders, take back control of your laws, take back control of your money. And so immigration gave [00:31:00] arguments about sovereignty a really powerful hook, which at the moment it doesn’t have, I don’t think you’re going to get the same kind of explosive situation over, I don’t know, customs forms or something of that kind. But that isn’t to say that there won’t at some point become a major question, which might again be about the border with Northern Ireland or something of that kind, that does actually suddenly reanimate interest in this issue and we won’t have got any further with resolving it.

确实如此。“夺回控制权”（take back control）这一口号之所以极其高明，是因为它既包含民主诉求，又将其与具体的实质性事务联系了起来——夺回对边境、法律和财政的控制权。移民议题为“主权”这一抽象概念提供了一个极具号召力的切入点，而目前其他议题并不具备这种特质；我不认为诸如海关申报单之类的问题会引发同样的舆论风暴。但这并不意味着未来不会出现某个重大问题——比如再次涉及北爱尔兰边境等类似情况——从而突然重新激起人们对这一议题的关注，而届时我们可能在解决该问题上仍未取得任何实质性进展。

Mark D’Arcy: And that brings us very neatly to the question that I had to sort of follow up on the Brexit arguments, which is are all the same forces at play over immigration? We’ve had the dreadful Henry Nowak case. We’ve had the horrible events in Northern Ireland. Are we now seeing those same forces, distrust of Parliament, a feeling that the elite’s slipping a policy, that the majority wouldn’t accept if they were asked, past people ever so quietly? Are those things going on on immigration now rather than on Brexit?

这就自然引出了一个问题，即针对“脱欧”争议的那些因素，是否同样体现在移民问题上？我们目睹了令人痛心的亨利·诺瓦克（Henry Nowak）案，也见证了北爱尔兰发生的骇人事件。如今，我们是否正目睹同样的动向——即对议会的不信任，以及一种“精英阶层在悄悄推行多数民众若被征询意见便不会接受的政策”的感觉？这些在“脱欧”问题上出现的情况，如今是否正在移民议题上重演？

Robert Saunders: I think there is one very important difference, which is that after 2016 you can actually [00:32:00] point to the referendum as evidence that Parliament is out of sync with the people. You can say we have a Parliament full of people who voted to Remain and an instruction from the people to Leave. And that could be held over Parliament all the way through that period. And we haven’t got a moment like that. There isn’t a kind of an alternative decision-making mechanism that stands outside Parliament.

我认为有一个非常重要的区别：2016年之后，人们确实可以援引那次公投作为证据，表明议会与民意脱节。当时的情况是，议会中充斥着支持“留欧”的议员，而民众的指令却是要求“脱欧”；这一矛盾在整个期间一直被用来向议会施压。但如今我们并没有这样的情况，也不存在一种游离于议会之外的替代性决策机制。

Mark D’Arcy: You can imagine people calling for a referendum to stop mass immigration, on something as simple as that.

你完全可以想象，人们可能会要求就“停止大规模移民”这样一个简单明确的问题就举行一次公投。

Robert Saunders: Yes. And if you did that, then you would have exactly the same dynamic again. In the absence of that, you’re clearly right that we do have the same kind of populist argument being made. I think you began this podcast by quoting Nigel Farage on the morning of the referendum result when he says this is a victory for real people. And that idea of real people has become absolutely central to our political rhetoric. And I think it is broadly accepted kind of unconsciously actually by both the main political parties, a sense that there is a real people out there and those [00:33:00] people probably are working class, they probably live in the north of England, and that those are the people who in a sense represent the real democracy as opposed to metropolitan elites. We haven’t used the word populism I think so far in this discussion, but the nature of populism is that it says that the people have a kind of single mind, a single intelligence, they all want the same thing. And you pit the people against the enemies of the people. That’s very different from a classic kind of parliamentary or pluralist model of democracy in which you say the people are a kind of glorious cacophony of different kinds of ideas and interests, who have different religious opinions, who have different economic interests, who do different jobs, live in different places, and democracy is always an argument among the people. Populism argues that democracy is about the people imposing their will on the enemies of the people or on elites, and that way of thinking clearly still structures a lot of our political arguments.

没错。如果真那样做了，局面恐怕又会回到原来的样子。即便不那样做，你说得完全没错：我们确实面临着同样的民粹主义论调。记得这期播客开头引用了奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）在公投结果揭晓当晚的话，他说这是“真正的人民”（real people）的胜利。这种“真正”的概念已成为我们政治话语的核心。我认为，两大主要政党实际上都在潜意识里接受了这种观念：即存在着一个“真正的人民”群体——他们往往属于工人阶级，多居住在英格兰北部——这些人某种程度上代表了真正的民主，与大都市的精英阶层形成鲜明对比。虽然我们在讨论中至今尚未明确使用“民粹主义”这个词，但民粹主义的本质在于它宣称民众拥有统一的思想和意志，诉求高度一致；它将民众与“人民之敌”对立起来。这与经典的议会制或多元主义民主模式截然不同：在后者看来，人民是一个由各种思想和利益交织而成的、充满多样性的群体——人们有着不同的宗教信仰、经济利益、职业和居住地，而民主本质上就是民众内部的各种观点交锋与辩论。相比之下，民粹主义主张民主就是让民众将其意志强加于“人民的敌人”或精英阶层之上；这种思维方式显然至今仍深刻影响着我们的许多政治争论。

Ruth Fox: One of the other things we haven’t talked about in this debate, and I think it’s more acute now than [00:34:00] it was at the time of the referendum, but it was heavily criticised then, is the role of another elite, which is the tech elites, the implications of things like social media on our debate. And of course we’re seeing discussions about that particularly pertinent in respect of what’s happened in Southampton, what’s happened in the terrible events in Northern Ireland, and what role essentially misinformation and whipping up of opinions on the Right, particularly not solely, but particularly on the Right through channels which are almost beyond political control. And we’re having this debate that’s happening in Parliament about how far the technology and how it operates can be put under democratic control. I just wonder what your perspective on that was. Because you’ve been quite strong in recent days on social media and yourself in saying that there needs to be more leadership and more people speaking out clearly against some of this.

在这次辩论中，我们尚未探讨的另一个议题——尽管当时就已备受诟病，但如今显得尤为紧迫——是另一类精英群体（即科技精英）所扮演的角色，以及社交媒体等事物对我们公共讨论的影响。当然，鉴于南安普顿发生的事件以及北爱尔兰发生的恶性事件，相关的讨论显得格外切题；这些事件凸显了虚假信息以及煽动舆论（特别是在右翼阵营，虽不仅限于右翼，但尤以右翼为甚）所起的作用，而这种煽动往往通过几乎不受政治力量管控的渠道进行。目前，议会正在辩论应在多大程度上将技术及其运作机制纳入民主监管之下。我很想听听您的看法，因为您最近在社交媒体上态度鲜明，强调需要有人挺身而出，发挥领导作用，明确反对这些现象。

Robert Saunders: Yes. If you go back to the 1970s, one of the arguments for European integration at that time was that there were now these [00:35:00] powerful global forces that were, in a sense, beyond the reach of any individual nation state, and that if you wanted to reassert some kind of democratic control over those forces, then you had to do it collectively. Now, what they meant were things like big American car manufacturers who could switch production from one country to another, almost at the push of a button. Or they were already starting to talk about things like the movement of global finance. That was on a much smaller scale than later. We’re not having that same debate, I think, to anything like the same extent about the extraordinary power of the tech bros, the fact that so much of Britain’s political argument now happens on a site that is algorithmically programmed to favour certain kinds of politics. The fact that one of our political parties has received tens of millions of pounds from people who don’t live in this country, don’t pay their taxes in this country, but have certain economic power over it. So it’s interesting that we had a very powerful and effective politics during Brexit that was to some extent about [00:36:00] restoring national sovereignty and removing foreign influence over Britain, that being understood as the European Union. I think there is the scope to create a similar kind of political project that actually says, how do we challenge another form of international influence on our politics? But it’s not particularly potent at the moment.

是的。回溯到20世纪70年代，当时支持欧洲一体化的论点之一是：出现了一些强大的全球力量，在某种意义上，任何单一民族国家（nation state）都无法掌控它们；如果想要对这些力量重新行使某种形式的民主控制，就必须采取集体行动。当时人们所指的，是像美国大型汽车制造商这类企业——它们几乎只需“按一下按钮”，就能将生产线从一个国家转移到另一个国家；或者是指当时已初露端倪的全球资本流动问题（尽管当时的规模远不及后来）。我认为，对于科技巨头（即所谓的“科技大佬”）所拥有的巨大权力，我们并未展开同等程度的讨论。我们很少讨论这样一个事实：英国当今许多政治辩论都发生在一个由算法驱动的平台上，而该算法在设计上倾向于特定的政治立场；也很少讨论这样一个事实：我们的某个政党曾收到数千万英镑的捐款，这些资金来自既不住在英国、也不在英国纳税，却对英国拥有某种经济影响力的人。因此，有趣的是，在“脱欧”期间，我们经历了一场声势浩大且卓有成效的政治运动，其核心诉求在某种程度上在于恢复国家主权（national sovereignty）并消除外国对英国的影响——当时这种“外国影响”主要被理解为来自欧盟的影响。我认为，我们完全有空间发起类似的政治议程，去探讨如何挑战另一种形式的国际政治影响力。然而，目前这种呼声尚未形成强大的声势。

Mark D’Arcy: So you can see the possibility there, the germ, if you like, of a political movement that wants us to declare independence from Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, for example.

由此可见其中蕴含的可能性——或者不妨说是某种政治运动的萌芽——这种运动主张我们摆脱埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）和马克·扎克伯格（Mark Zuckerberg）等人的控制，宣布独立（independence）。

Robert Saunders: Yes. The question is, I suppose, whether you can do that on the nation state level. There’s some evidence that perhaps you can. Brazil, for example, challenged the power of X. But it’s generally been assumed, I think, that this is something you’re going to have to do on some kind of collective international level. So you have the paradox that probably you need to move closer to the European Union again, in order to tame this different kind of foreign influence.

是的。我想问题在于，能否在民族国家层面上做到这一点。确实有一些迹象表明或许是可行的——例如，巴西就曾挑战过 X 公司的权力。但人们普遍认为，这需要在某种国际集体层面（collective international level）上来应对。这就产生了一个悖论：为了遏制这种新型的外部影响，我们或许反而需要向欧盟靠拢。

Mark D’Arcy: They’re big enough to regulate these people, but we are not.

他们也许有足够的实力去监管这些人，但我们没有。

Robert Saunders: Right. Exactly.

对的。正是如此。

Mark D’Arcy: And with that, Ruth, perhaps it’s the moment to take a break, and when we come back, we might like to talk about what’s been happening to Sir Keir Starmer, who as we’ve recorded [00:37:00] today, has been having a bit of a day.

说到这里，露丝，也许现在是休息一下的时候了；等我们回来，不妨谈谈基尔·斯塔默爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）的情况——正如我们今天早些时候提到的，他这一天过得可真够呛。

Ruth Fox: See you in a minute.

待会见吧。

Well, Mark, and we’re back. And I think we all thought today might be a quiet day at Westminster for this conversation reflecting on the last 10 years. But in fact, as we’re recording, John Healey has resigned as Defence Secretary. He’s called out the Prime Minister over the DIP, of which we’ve talked a number of times on this podcast, the Defence Investment Plan, and the fact that, in his words, the settlement is just not good enough and is nowhere near what’s needed for the defence of the country, for our armed forces. So he has gone. And Robert, when we last had you on this podcast, around Christmas time, the theme of our discussion was, is being Prime Minister an impossible job? And I think Keir Starmer’s got another problem on his hands.

好了，马克，我们回来。本来我们都以为，在威斯敏斯特，今天会是平静的一天——原本打算借此机会回顾过去十年的历程并展开讨论。但事实上，就在我们录制节目的当下，约翰·希利（John Healey）已经辞去了国防大臣一职。他公开批评了首相在“国防投资计划”[49]（DIP）上的做法——我们在本播客中已多次讨论过这一计划。用他的话说，目前的拨款安排根本不够好，远无法满足国家防务及武装部队的实际需求。所以，他选择了离开。罗伯特，记得上次你做客本播客时正值圣诞节前后，当时我们讨论的主题是“担任首相是否是一项‘不可能完成的任务’？”看来，基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）如今又面临着新的难题。

Robert Saunders: Yes. Although, I mean, he’s lasted longer than most of his predecessors.

是的。不过，话说回来，他的任期比他的大多数前任都要长。

Ruth Fox: Recent predecessors. Yes.

近期的前任啊。对的。

Robert Saunders: Well, I think all the problems that we discussed in that episode are manifest in what’s happening at the moment, and we’ve perhaps got three problems clustered together. [00:38:00] On the one hand, politics is facing genuinely really big and difficult problems. And I think the DIP illustrates that, that there’s a widespread sense across politics that we need to spend more on our armed forces, and that the kind of long Cold War dividend has probably now been exhausted. But we’re operating at a time when there is no money, when the economy hasn’t grown for a long period of time, when the tax system looks like it’s reaching its outer limits. You set that alongside Ukraine, the crisis in Iran, all the other big questions that government’s wrestling with. This is a genuinely difficult time to govern. We’re sending into those very stormy waters an extraordinarily inexperienced crew. We talked in that previous episode about how political careers have got much shorter, about how politicians don’t acquire much experience of things like party management. They don’t sort of learn their trade through a series of small crises before coming into Number 10. Keir Starmer never held a ministerial office other than being Prime Minister. So it’s not surprising, perhaps, that this crew is finding it difficult to navigate [00:39:00] these waters. And the boats they’re sailing in, in terms of the parties, are taking on water fast. So if politics is kind of a Bermuda Triangle at the moment, that sinks everybody who tries to make a journey through it, I think there are reasons for that.

我认为我们在那一期节目中讨论过的所有问题，如今都在当下的局势中显现了出来；这或许涉及三个交织在一起的难题。一方面，政界正面临着真正重大且棘手的挑战。我认为《国防工业战略》（DIP）就印证了这一点：政界普遍认为有必要增加军费开支，而冷战时期留下的“和平红利”恐怕也已消耗殆尽。然而，我们所处的环境却是财政拮据——经济长期停滞不前，税收体系似乎也已逼近极限。再加上乌克兰局势、伊朗危机以及政府亟待解决的其他重大议题，当下的执政环境确实异常艰难。而我们却派出了一个经验极度匮乏的团队，去驾驭这片波涛汹涌的“水域”。我们在上一期节目中曾谈到，如今政治生涯变得愈发短暂，政客们往往缺乏党务管理等方面的经验积累；他们在入主唐宁街10号之前，并未经历过一系列小规模危机的历练。以基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）为例，他在出任首相之前从未担任过任何部长级职务。因此，这支团队在应对当前局势时感到举步维艰，也就不足为奇了。况且，他们所驾驶的“船只”——即各自所属的政党——也正面临着严重进水、岌岌可危的境地。如果说当下的政坛宛如一个“百慕大三角”，吞噬着每一个试图穿越其中的人，那么这背后显然是有其深层原因的。

Mark D’Arcy: But this is a body blow to Sir Keir Starmer. He’s already facing the expectation that if Andy Burnham wins the Makerfield by-election he’ll come straight down to Westminster and almost immediately there’ll be some kind of leadership challenge and he could well be replaced. Because his MPs are sort of smarting from the horrors of the May elections and are basically extremely worried about their survival. And now John Healey opens a new front on this issue of defence spending. And he’s a very interesting figure in a lot of ways. He’s one of the more experienced ministers in this government. He was, I think, housing minister under Gordon Brown, who was just below Cabinet level when they Labour last lost office, and was one of the people that was being lined up as a potential alternative to Sir Keir Starmer had he been consumed by earlier scandals like the beergate[50] scandal, had he been drinking [00:40:00] beer when he shouldn’t have been during the pandemic. And he’s also seen as someone who’s very much a straight-up party loyalist, who’s party loyalism has been overridden by the desperate need to get more defence spending. So Keir Starmer has all sorts of difficulties in front of him, not least finding a viable replacement.

但这无疑是对基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）爵士的一次重创。他本已面临一种预期：如果安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）赢得梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）[51]的补选，他将直接进驻威斯敏斯特，随即可能引发某种形式的领导权挑战，斯塔默本人甚至可能因此被取代。这是因为工党议员们仍对五月份选举的惨败心有余悸，且极度担忧自己的政治前途。如今，约翰·希利（John Healey）又在国防开支问题上开辟了新的战线。希利在许多方面都是一位颇受关注的人物。他是本届政府中资历较深的大臣之一。他曾在戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）任内担任住房大臣，在工党上次下野时，他的职位仅次于内阁级别；此外，当斯塔默此前深陷丑闻（如“啤酒门”事件——即在疫情期间违规饮酒）时，希利曾被视为潜在的替代人选之一。他一向被视为坚定的党内忠诚派，但如今，争取更多国防开支的迫切需求似乎压倒了他对党的忠诚。因此，基尔·斯塔默面前困难重重，而寻找一位切实可行的继任者无疑是其中最棘手的难题之一。

Robert Saunders: Yes, it is a body blow, but then we could say it’s the latest in an extraordinary series of body blows. And actually I think an interesting feature of British politics over the last, well nearly 20 years actually, has been a phenomenon that we might think of as kind of zombie premierships. There comes a point in a premiership in which a Prime Minister is essentially politically dead, but they remain in office in a sort of undead form. Because actually it’s not straightforward getting rid of a Prime Minister. We might take Gordon Brown, for example, who is sort of politically dead, from the election that wasn’t, onwards, but actually has another, what, two and a half years in power. Theresa May was politically dead as soon as the polls closed in 2017, and yet she lasts for [00:41:00] another two years. This trust obviously is the exception that proves the rule in the sense that she was kind of in and out very quickly. But Rishi Sunak, likewise, his premiership continues for quite a long period of time after it’s clear that he’s lost authority. That’s not a prediction that Keir Starmer is going to survive. But I think a curious feature of our politics has been a recurring phenomenon in which Prime Ministers experience blows that essentially shatter their authority and their capacity to govern their parties, but remain in office after that.

没错，这确实是一次重创，但也可以说，这是一连串非同寻常的重创中的最新一次。事实上，我认为过去——嗯，其实是近20年来——英国政治的一个有趣特征，就是出现了一种我们可以称之为“僵尸首相”（ zombie premierships）的现象。首相任期内往往会出现这样一个时刻：尽管其政治生命实际上已经终结，却仍以一种“不死”的状态继续在位。因为要罢免一位首相并非易事。以戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）为例，从那场“未成行的大选”开始，他在政治上其实就已经“死亡”了，但实际上他又继续执政了——大概有两年半之久吧。特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）在2017年大选投票结束的那一刻，政治生命便已终结，然而她却又坚持了两年。利兹·特拉斯（Liz Truss）显然是个反例，印证了这一规律，因为她的任期非常短暂，来去匆匆。但里希·苏纳克（Rishi Sunak）的情况也类似：即便其权威式微已成定局，他的首相任期依然延续了相当长一段时间。这并不是说基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）就一定能挺过难关。但我认为，英国政治的一个奇特之处在于这种反复出现的现象：首相遭受重创，导致其权威及驾驭政党的能力几乎彻底瓦解，却依然留任。

Mark D’Arcy: Yes. I’ve been watching social media as the news of John Healey’s resignation unfolded. Lots of praise from all sorts of Conservative MPs who are absolutely delighted to see the former Defence Secretary essentially making their case that this government isn’t spending enough on the defence of the realm. There’s a recent weighing-in by Al Carns, the junior defence minister tipped as a dark horse candidate for the leadership himself because of his very glamorous background in Special Forces, who praised John Healey’s work to the skies, but then said that there are serious people doing serious things in the armed forces and they need a [00:42:00] defence ministry that continues to provide support for them, which is essentially his explanation for not resigning in John Healey’s wake, that the show has to go on and the Ministry of Defence has to maintain its support for our service personnel abroad.

是的。我一直在关注社交媒体上关于约翰·希利（John Healey）辞职消息的动态。许多保守党议员对此大加赞赏，他们非常乐见这位前国防大臣的言行实际上印证了他们的观点——即现任政府在国家防务上的投入严重不足。负责国防事务的初级大臣阿尔·卡恩斯（Al Carns）最近也发表了看法；他因其显赫的特种部队服役背景而被视为党魁竞选的“黑马”人选。他在极力称赞约翰·希利工作表现的同时，也指出武装部队中有一群务实的人在从事着至关重要的工作，他们需要一个能持续提供有力支持的国防部。这实际上解释了他为何没有追随希利辞职：因为工作必须继续，国防部必须维持对海外服役人员的支持。

Robert Saunders: Yes, you could say that there’s a sense that nothing in his ministerial career so befitted him as the manner of his leaving it. That people who resign on points of principle are always extraordinarily popular, particularly with the Opposition. They suddenly get elevated into kind of political titans.

没错，人们确实会觉得，在他担任部长的整个生涯中，没有什么比他离职的方式更显其风范了。那些因原则问题而辞职的人总是备受推崇，尤其是在反对派眼中；他们仿佛一下子就成了政坛的重量级人物。

Mark D’Arcy: John Healey’s also put out a statement that he doesn’t see himself running against Sir Keir Starmer for the leadership. And I found myself immediately thinking about that classic episode of Yes Minister, in which Jim Hacker is asked if he’s planning a tilt at the leadership and he replies, my wife and I are hoping to spend more time with the family. You are running!

约翰·希利（John Healey）也发表声明称，他不打算竞选党魁以挑战基尔·斯塔默爵士（Sir Keir Starmer）。这让我立刻联想到经典剧集《是，大臣》（Yes Minister）中的一幕：当吉姆·哈克（Jim Hacker）被问及是否有意角逐党魁之位时，他回答说：“我和妻子希望能多花些时间陪伴家人。”——这意思分明就是你要参选！

Ruth Fox: But John Healey’s letter of resignation, he refers in it to the Prime Minister being unable and the Treasury being unwilling to essentially put together the funding package that’s needed [00:43:00] for the defence of the country. Now that is about as damning a statement about the government as you could make, if you think that at the very least the one thing a government must do is defence of the nation above all else, but in terms of the Labour politics of this, I mean, the first question Mark you raise, who might replace him? I mean, who’s willing to take on the role of Defence Secretary in the circumstances, particularly when we’re only a week away from the Makerfield by-election and who knows then what unfolds after that and how quickly. But the reality is that most people on the Labour back benches don’t want to make the kind of decisions that John Healey is telling them need to be made. And that’s fundamentally the political problem no matter who the leader is. The statement says essentially the settlement will be 0.08% of an increase in defence spending. I mean that really doesn’t touch the sides, does it?

在约翰·希利（John Healey）的辞职信中，他提到首相无力、财政部也不愿筹措国家防务所需的资金方案。如果认为保卫国家是政府的首要职责，那么这种说法对政府而言简直是极具杀伤力的指责。不过，从工党内部政治的角度来看——也就是你马克（Mark）提出的第一个问题——谁来接替他呢？毕竟，在当前这种局势下，谁愿意出任国防大臣？尤其是考虑到梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）选区的补选仅剩一周，而补选之后局势如何演变、变化速度有多快，都充满了不确定性。但现实情况是，工党的大多数后座议员并不想做出约翰·希利所主张的那种决策。无论谁担任党魁，这在根本上都是一个政治难题。该声明实质上表明，国防预算的增幅仅为0.08%。说真的，这点增幅简直是杯水车薪，不是吗？

Mark D’Arcy: And John Healey rather resentfully remarks in his letter that he only got the actual final DIP deal on Monday afternoon. So I think that was probably much resented that he [00:44:00] wasn’t more involved in developing it to start with. But all the same, he’s essentially asking Labour MPs to acquiesce to cuts in the welfare budget, possibly in the NHS and other things that they care a lot more about, in order to fund the defence build-up now. And that’s a pretty hard sell with a Labour Party that revolted against the idea of welfare cuts not all that long ago.

约翰·希利（John Healey）在信中颇有怨言地指出，他直到周一下午才拿到最终确定的DIP（国防综合审查）方案。因此，他对于自己未能从一开始就参与方案制定显然感到不满。尽管如此，他实际上是在要求工党议员默许削减福利预算——甚至可能削减NHS（国家医疗服务体系）及其他他们更为关心的领域的经费——以便为当前的国防扩充提供资金。对于不久前才强烈反对削减福利这一主张的工党而言，要让他们接受这一点绝非易事

Robert Saunders: And I think that line in the resignation letter about being unable to decide is the one that’s particularly damaging because the case that Starmer’s defenders have been making, I think, for keeping him as Prime Minister is broadly, what do you think is actually going to change as a result of a new leader? Because the structural conditions all going to be the same. The economy is still going to be a disaster. We’re still going to have all of the problems in the Middle East. We’re not going to change our fiscal rules. We can’t break our manifesto commitments. So do you really want to just go through the psychodrama that the Conservatives inflicted on the country over and over again, of changing leader when there’s no obvious payout at the end of it? And the response to that has tended to be: okay, the [00:45:00] broad conditions might not change, but there are two attributes of leadership that could change. One is the capacity to communicate. One is a sense of you might have a leader who has an understanding of politics as a kind of pulpit, someone who can speak for and to the country. And that’s always been kind of the Andy Burnham and the Wes Streeting case. But secondly, that you need a Prime Minister who can make decisions. And I’m not in Number 10 so I don’t know if this is accurate or not, but a recurring criticism of Keir Starmer is that he doesn’t actually like making decisions on these big questions. So I think that line is going to be really harmful to him.

我认为辞职信中提到“无法做决定”的那句话尤其具有杀伤力，因为斯塔默（Starmer）的支持者们主张让他继续担任首相，其核心论点大致是：换个新领导人究竟能带来什么实质性改变呢？毕竟，各种结构性条件依然如故：经济状况依然糟糕，中东问题依旧棘手，财政规则不会改变，竞选纲领中的承诺也不能违背。那么，难道真的要重蹈保守党曾让国家饱受折磨的那种“心理闹剧”——即在没有明显收益的情况下反复更换领导人吗？对此，人们的普遍回应是：诚然，大环境或许难以改变，但领导力中有两个特质是可以改变的。其一是沟通能力——即拥有一位将政治视为“布道台”的领导人，一位既能代表国家又能与民众有效对话的人；这向来是安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）和韦斯·斯特里廷（Wes Streeting）被看好的原因。其二则是需要一位能够拍板做决定的首相。虽然我不在唐宁街10号任职，无法确证传闻是否属实，但针对基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）的一个常见批评就是：他实际上并不喜欢在重大问题上做决定。因此，我认为那句话对他而言将造成极大的负面影响。

Mark D’Arcy: I’m old enough to remember a speech by Nigel Lawson. I think he was attacking John Major over the council tax or something years ago when he was still in the House of Commons. And he quoted a French politician who remarked that to govern is to choose. And he added the rather deadly rider, that to appear to be unable to choose is to appear to be unable to govern. And I think that’s now the essential case against Sir Keir Starmer, that he’s basically too focussed on process and too unwilling to decide things in [00:46:00] the teeth of any institutional resistance from members of his Cabinet. I’m looking at you Rachel Reeves.

我年纪不小了，还记得奈杰尔·劳森（Nigel Lawson）当年在下议院发表过的一次演讲。那大概是几年前的事了，当时他正就地方税（council tax）或其他议题抨击约翰·梅杰（John Major）。他引用了一位法国政治家的话：“治理即抉择”（to govern is to choose）。随后，他补充了一句极具杀伤力的评语：若显得无法做出抉择，便等同于显得无力治理。我认为，这正是目前针对基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）爵士的主要批评所在——他过于拘泥于程序，且面对内阁成员的体制性阻力时，往往不愿拍板做决定。我说的就是你，雷切尔·里夫斯（Rachel Reeves）。

Robert Saunders: And there is obviously something institutional about the authority of a Prime Minister. It’s about how many votes can you command in the House of Commons, but there’s also something intangible, which is about a sense that you have authority and a sense that you are in fact kind of performing government. So, again, to go back to John Major, one of the most damning lines against him was the idea that he was in office but not in power, he inhabited the post but couldn’t actually any longer govern either his party or the country. And another very damning line was Tony Blair’s, who as Leader of the Opposition said to him: the difference between us is that I lead my party, he follows his. And I think John Major comments in his memoirs that that line really hit home because he sort of knew it was true.

显然，首相的权威具有某种制度性特征。这不仅关乎在下议院能掌控多少选票，还涉及一种无形的特质——即那种“拥有权威”的感觉，以及那种“确实在行使执政职能”的实感。回看约翰·梅杰（John Major）的例子，当时对他最具杀伤力的批评之一就是“虽在位却无实权”——意指他虽占据首相之位，却已无法真正驾驭其政党或治理国家。另一句极具杀伤力的话出自托尼·布莱尔（Tony Blair）之口；当时身为反对党领袖的布莱尔曾对他说：“你我之间的区别在于，我领导我的政党，而你是被你的政党牵着鼻子走。”梅杰在回忆录中提到，这句话之所以让他深感刺痛，正是因为他心里清楚这是事实。

Mark D’Arcy: And so here we have Keir Starmer now desperately wounded by this. As you say, he might cling on in a sort of zombie role, as you put it, for a while, even for years. Or we could have an almost instant leadership [00:47:00] contest the moment Andy Burnham puts his feet over the threshold of Parliament, and that’s making the assumption he actually wins this forthcoming by-election, of course.

因此，基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）如今已深受重创。正如你所言，他或许能像你形容的那样，以一种“僵尸”般的状态勉强维持一段时间，甚至数年之久。又或者，一旦安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）踏入议会大门——当然，这建立在他赢得即将到来的补选这一前提之上——党内领导权之争便可能随即爆发。

Ruth Fox: And also, will we not perhaps have a coronation as opposed to a contest? I mean is that not a possibility after Makerfield?

此外，我们是否可能会迎来一场“加冕”（coronation）而非激烈的竞争？我的意思是，在梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）之后，这难道不是一种可能吗？

Mark D’Arcy: Well, it seems to me entirely possible that basically a second front has been opened here by John Healey. Now it’s not just Andy Burnham’s critique anymore. You’ve got John Healey’s critique and they’re critiquing on two different issues. And Andy Burnham might not want to take on board John Healey’s critique, Andy Burnham might not want to commit himself to a vast extension of defence spending at the expense of social programmes.

在我看来，约翰·希利（John Healey）实际上开辟了“第二战线”（a second front），这完全是有可能的。现在，批评的声音不再仅仅来自安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）一方；约翰·希利也加入了批评行列，而且两人针对的是不同的议题。安迪·伯纳姆未必愿意采纳希利的批评意见，也未必愿意承诺以牺牲社会项目为代价，大幅增加国防开支。

Robert Saunders: And we talked earlier about the problem with Labour’s leadership rules, that in principle it firstly asks the Prime Minister to stop governing the country for a period of time and to go around Labour Party membership fighting a leadership contest, and secondly it creates this really difficult situation in which a group of people outside Parliament get to decide whether or not he stays in office. When your leadership rules are that bad, the temptation for parties is to [00:48:00] try to circumvent them, to try not to use your own leadership processes simply to force Keir Starmer to resign, and to engineer some kind of coronation[52]. So I suspect if Andy Burnham does win the Makerfield by-election, we might see things like more resignations, more ways of trying to put pressure, in the same way that ultimately what brings down Boris Johnson is not the Conservative Party’s processes, it’s just a series of resignations that collapse his ability to govern.

我们之前讨论过工党领袖选举规则存在的问题[53]：原则上，这些规则首先要求首相在一段时间内停止治理国家，转而奔走于工党党员之间角逐党魁之位；其次，它造成了一种极其棘手的局面，即由议会外的一群人来决定他是否留任。当领袖选举规则如此糟糕时，政党往往会试图绕过这些规则——即不走党内既定的领袖选举程序来迫使基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）辞职，而是策划某种形式的“直接拥立”（some kind of coronation，即无需经过竞争性选举便确立新领袖）。因此我推测，如果安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）赢得了梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）的补选，我们可能会看到更多人辞职以及各种施压手段的出现；这就像最终导致鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）下台的并非保守党的党内程序，而是一连串的辞职潮导致其执政能力（ability to govern）彻底瓦解。

Mark D’Arcy: So our history repeats itself once again. I suppose that leaves all sorts of questions open now. Who is going to replace John Healey, is an immediate thought. I mean, who would want to step into those shoes? Especially if they’re going to have to accept a Defence Investment Programme that isn’t what John Healey says is necessary for the defence of the realm. That’s going to be a pretty hard sell for a start, a big test for Keir Starmer if he can find someone to step into the shoes.

历史就这样再次重演了。这自然引发了一连串悬而未决的问题（leaves all sorts of questions open）。人们首先想到的是：谁来接替约翰·希利（John Healey）？毕竟，谁会愿意接下这个重担呢？尤其是接任者还得接受一项国防投资计划——而该计划的内容并不符合希利本人认为保卫国家安全所必需的标准。单是这一点就很难让人接受，而如果基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）真能找到继任人选，这对他也将是一次严峻的考验。

Ruth Fox: Yes, and I think the question of whether the Defence Investment Plan will now be published in these circumstances, it must be in question. I mean, I don’t know whether you saw it Mark this week, the Speaker had an absolute [00:49:00] go at the government minister, I think it was Luke Pollard, answering a question in the House this week because the Speaker had got wind of a suggestion that the Defence Investment Plan will be published as we are recording today on Thursday, tomorrow, Friday. And he basically said that would just be unacceptable, a complete mistreatment of Parliament, treating MPs as second-class citizens. And he wasn’t having it. And interestingly, in the House, the defence minister did not say: no, Mr. Speaker, you’ve got it wrong, I don’t know where you’ve heard that, we are not publishing on Friday. But subsequently John Healey did make a statement or answered a question from the media and made clear that no, it wouldn’t be published on Friday. So we have to assume it’s not coming out in these circumstances this week. But as I understand it, the timetable, they are under considerable pressure to get it out before the NATO summit because NATO allies are getting increasingly queasy about what our position is and whether we are going to commit to the requisite level of spending that’s needed.

没错，而且我认为在当前这种情况下，《国防投资计划》是否还会如期发布，确实要打个问号。马克，不知道你有没有看到本周发生的一幕：下议院议长严厉训斥了一位政府大臣——我想应该是卢克·波拉德（Luke Pollard）——当时他正在议会回答提问。议长之所以发火，是因为他听到风声说《国防投资计划》将在周五（也就是我们今天录制节目的第二天）发布。他明确表示这完全不可接受，是对议会的极度不尊重，简直是把议员当成二等公民对待；他对此坚决反对。有趣的是，当时在议会，那位国防大臣并没有反驳说：“不，议长先生，您弄错了，我不知道您从哪儿听来的消息，我们并不打算在周五发布。”不过，约翰·希利（John Healey）随后发表声明或在回应媒体提问时明确表示，该计划确实不会在周五发布。因此，我们只能推断，在当前形势下，该计划本周不会出台了。但据我了解，他们面临着巨大的时间压力，必须在北约峰会[54]召开前发布该计划，因为北约盟友对我们的立场以及我们是否会承诺达到必要的军费开支水平越来越感到不安。

Mark D’Arcy: I suppose you’ve got to say it’d be a fun gig to be the new Secretary of State for Defence going in to bat in the House of Commons for the [00:50:00] defence investment statement. So I think that’s a cup that I think a lot of people would like to pass from them.

想必你会觉得，作为新任国防大臣，在下议院就国防投资声明进行辩护，这会是一项很有意思的工作——不过，这恐怕也是许多人唯恐避之不及的“烫手山芋”（a cup that I think a lot of people would like to pass from them）。[55]

Robert Saunders: It all reminds me a little bit of that great political movie, The NeverEnding Story. There is a sense that sort of the Nothing is just consuming British politics at the moment. And you have this terrible problem that a really important decision needs to be made, arguably one of the most important decisions of the parliament, and yet everybody knows that the leadership of the party is simply in a holding pattern, that it is waiting for the Makerfield by-election. It’s waiting to discover whether there will be a change of leadership or not. And in that sense, you both have to make a big decision now and cannot make a big decision now.

这一切不禁让人联想到那部伟大的政治电影——《大魔域》（The NeverEnding Story）[56]。人们有一种感觉，仿佛某种“虚无”（the Nothing）正在吞噬当下的英国政坛。眼下存在一个严峻的问题：必须做出一个至关重要的决定——这堪称本届议会面临的最重大决策之一——然而大家都清楚，党内高层目前正处于一种停滞观望的状态，在等待梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）选区的补选结果，等待确定是否会发生领导层更迭。从这个意义上讲，局面陷入了一种既必须立即做出重大决策、却又无法做出重大决策的矛盾困境。

Mark D’Arcy: Ouch. And I suppose the other point to make is that the position of Rachel Reeves as Chancellor now must be in increasing question over this as well, because a new leader coming in may have to find that money and Rachel Reeves is very unwilling to find it. Apparently.

哎呀。还有一点值得指出的是，受此影响，瑞秋·里夫斯（Rachel Reeves）作为财政大臣的地位恐怕也日益受到质疑；因为新任领导人上台后可能不得不设法筹措这笔资金，而里夫斯显然极不情愿这么做。

Robert Saunders: Yes. Although they may also be very nervous of doing anything that’s going to spook financial markets. And so in the sense there may be an argument for keeping the current Chancellor.

没错。不过，他们也可能非常担心采取任何会惊扰金融市场的举措。从这个角度来看，留任现任财政大臣或许也有其道理。

Mark D’Arcy: Yes, well they’re caught in quite a number of binds.

没错，他们确实陷入了诸多两难的境地。

Ruth Fox: Well, on that score Mark, I [00:51:00] think we should leave it there and tell listeners, as we’re talking about the Makerfield by-election and what may happen, we’re going to be actually recording a day later than usual next week. We’re going to be recording on the Friday, not our usual Thursday, in order that we can cover the result. And we hope there will be a result, not endless recounts, not a tie or endless recounts.

关于这一点，马克，我想我们就谈到这里。还要告诉听众朋友们，鉴于我们正在讨论梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）选区的补选及其可能的结果，下周我们的录制时间会比平时推迟一天——我们会改在周五录制，而不是惯常的周四，以便能涵盖选举结果。我们也希望届时能有明确的结果，而不是陷入无休止的重新计票，或是出现平局及反复重计的局面。

Mark D’Arcy: It’s not California.[57]

放心吧，这不是加州。

Ruth Fox: So I’m assuming that there will be a result in the early hours of the morning. And then, assuming if Andy Burnham wins, we’ll no doubt have news of his restoration plan to return to Westminster. If he doesn’t, if Reform win, then what happens to Keir Starmer’s position? What happens to the Labour government? It could all be very chaotic, but we’ll be back next Friday to talk about it.

所以，我预计结果会在凌晨时分揭晓。当然，如果安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）获胜，我们毫无疑问会听到有关他“回归威斯敏斯特”的政治复出计划的消息。如果他没有获胜，而是改革英国党（Reform UK）赢得选举，那么基尔·斯塔默（Keir Starmer）的地位会受到怎样的影响？工党政府又会面临什么局面？这一切都可能变得非常混乱。不过，我们会在下周五回来，继续讨论这些问题。

Mark D’Arcy: The most consequential by-election pretty much ever. I suppose. So, until next week, listeners, goodbye from all of us and thanks very much indeed to Robert.

这大概是有史以来最具影响力的一场补选了吧。我想可以这么说。那么，听众朋友们，我们下周再见。感谢大家收听，也非常感谢 Robert 今天的参与。

Robert Saunders: Thank you.

谢谢。

Ruth Fox: See you soon. Thanks. Bye bye.

随后见。谢谢。拜拜。

Outro: Parliament Matters is produced by the Hansard Society and supported by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. For more information, visit hansardsociety.org.uk/pm, or find us on social media @HansardSociety.

《议会事务》（Parliament Matters）由汉萨德学会（Hansard Society）制作，并得到 Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust 的支持。想了解更多信息，请访问 hansardsociety.org.uk/pm，或者在社交媒体平台关注 @HansardSociety。

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[1] 英国退欧公投事件是英国于2016年6月23日举行的全民公投，决定是否脱离欧盟。此次公投由首相卡梅伦领导的保守党政府发起，4600万选民参与投票，最终51.89%的选民选择脱欧，投票率达72%。公投结果导致卡梅伦辞职，保守党内部重组并由特蕾莎·梅接任首相，英国启动《里斯本条约》第50条脱欧程序。

[2] 《English Historical Review》（通常缩写为 EHR）是英语世界历史最悠久的史学学术期刊，创刊于1886年1月。该刊由牛津大学出版社（Oxford University Press）出版，每年发行5期，分别在2月、4月、6月、9月和11月出版。其ISSN为0013-8266，EISSN为1477-4534。

[3] 《English Historical Review》（通常缩写为 EHR）是英语世界历史最悠久的史学学术期刊，创刊于1886年1月。该刊由牛津大学出版社（Oxford University Press）出版，每年发行5期，分别在2月、4月、6月、9月和11月出版。其ISSN为0013-8266，EISSN为1477-4534。

[4] 议会民主是一种以议会作为主要民主代表机构的政治制度。在该制度中，政府通常由议会多数派产生，并向议会负责。与总统制民主不同，议会民主中行政权与立法权之间并不存在严格分立，政府首脑（如英国首相）通常来自议会多数党。英国、德国、日本等国家均采用不同形式的议会民主制度。

[5] 总统制民主是一种行政权由民选总统直接掌握的民主制度。总统通常同时兼具国家元首与政府首脑身份，并拥有独立于议会的政治合法性。总统制强调行政权与立法权的分立，典型例子是美国政治制度。与议会民主相比，总统制可能更强调直接选举赋予行政领导人的民主授权。

[6] 直接民主指公民不通过政治代表，而是直接参与政治决策的民主形式，例如公民投票、公民创制、公民复决等。古希腊雅典民主常被视为历史上的典型案例，而现代国家通常仅在特定议题（如宪法修改、重大政策决定）中采用有限形式的直接民主。

[7] 自由民主是一种将民主原则建立于自由主义法权秩序之上的政治形式。与单纯强调“人民统治”或多数决原则的民主观不同，自由民主认为，民主权力本身必须受到个人自由权利、宪法秩序和法治原则的限制。自由主义以具有个人意志的权利主体作为其思想的根源，强调限制权力、保护个人免受国家或民粹主义的侵害。

[8] 产业民主指将民主原则扩展到经济与工作场所之中的理念，主张劳动者应参与生产管理和生产决策。其形式包括工人代表参与企业治理、工人委员会、合作社制度等。产业民主与社会主义传统、工会运动以及欧洲社会民主主义关系密切，例如各式各样的工厂委员会实践和德国的“共同决定制度”（Mitbestimmung）允许工人在大型企业监督委员会中拥有代表席位都在此列。

[9] 社会民主是一种主张通过民主政治和国家干预实现社会平等的政治传统，与传统的政治民主相对，社会民主运动倾向于更深入的“社会民主”。早期社会民主主义与马克思主义社会主义关系密切。但是在第二国际解散后，社会民主主义的温和派与更为激进的共产主义者分裂，从而使得温和的社会民主主义开始转向改良路线。20世纪后，社会民主运动逐渐转向支持议会民主、福利国家和混合经济模式。现代欧洲，自称社会民主党的政党通常强调在资本主义框架内，通过税收、社会保障和公共服务减少经济不平等。

[10] 基督教民主是一种起源于19世纪末欧洲天主教社会思想的政治传统，强调家庭、社区、社会责任以及基于基督教伦理的社会秩序。二战后，基督教民主党在西欧政治中发挥重要作用，例如德国的基督教民主联盟（CDU）和意大利的基督教民主党。它通常既反对自由放任资本主义，也反对社会主义式国家控制。

[11] “市场民主”并非一个具有严格统一定义的政治制度术语，而是一种将市场机制理解为某种民主选择形式的观点。其核心思想是消费者通过购买行为表达偏好，市场竞争因此具有类似民主投票的功能。这一概念常见于自由主义经济思想中，例如奥地利学派和新自由主义理论中关于“消费者主权”的讨论。但批评者认为，市场选择与政治民主不同，因为财富分配的不平等会影响个体实际影响力。

[12] “人民之敌”（Enemies of the People）是英国脱欧争议期间英国小报《每日邮报》（Daily Mail）2016年11月4日使用的著名标题，用于批评英国最高法院法官裁定：政府启动《里斯本条约》第50条、正式开启脱欧程序，需要经过议会授权。该标题被广泛认为反映了脱欧争议中对司法独立和宪政制度的攻击。

[13] 这里指2019年英国首相鲍里斯·约翰逊（Boris Johnson）建议女王批准议会休会（prorogation）的事件。该措施发生于脱欧期限临近之际，被反对者认为是为了限制议会阻止“无协议脱欧”的能力。英国最高法院随后裁定该建议属于非法行为，认为其对议会履行宪法职责造成了严重阻碍。

[14] 2016年6月23日，英国举行“英国是否应继续留在欧洲联盟”（UK EU membership referendum）公投。投票结果在次日凌晨逐渐揭晓：Leave（脱欧）占比51.9%，Remain（留欧）占比48.1%。2016年6月24日凌晨，在英国脱欧公投结果公布后，英国独立党（UKIP）领导人奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）在伦敦威斯敏斯特举行的脱欧阵营庆祝活动中发表讲话，宣称脱欧胜利是“真正人民”（real people）、“普通人民”（ordinary people）和“正派人民”（decent people）的胜利。该表述体现了脱欧运动中典型的民粹主义人民观，即将“真正的人民”与政治精英、金融机构和既有制度力量相对立。

[15] 指欧洲主权国家通过政治、经济、法律和文化等多领域融合，逐步打破内部壁垒、建立共同治理体系，最终形成超国家联合体的历史进程。这一进程起源于第二次世界大战后欧洲各国对安全重建与经济整合的现实需求，其根本动力在于通过制度化的深度合作，确保欧洲持久和平与稳定。

[16] 议会主权是英国宪政体制的根本性原则，其核心要义在于：议会拥有最高的立法权，可以制定、修改或废止任何法律，且没有任何机构——包括法院、政府乃至君主——有权否决或推翻议会所通过的法律。这一原则通常被概括为“议会可以做任何事，唯独不能限制下一届议会”（Parliament can do everything except bind its successor）。
该原则的理论奠基人是19世纪英国宪法学者阿尔伯特·维恩·戴雪（A.V. Dicey），他在《宪法研究导论》（Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 1885）中将其系统阐述为三项要素：（1）议会拥有制定或废除任何法律的绝对权力；（2）没有任何机构或个人有权推翻或废止议会立法；（3）不存在任何比议会更高或与之对等的立法机构。戴雪认为，议会主权是英国法治（rule of law）的前提与保障。

[17] 确认性公投（confirmatory referendum）指在代议制机构（如议会）已就某一具体政策或法律方案完成内部审议并作出原则性决定后，将该最终方案提交全体选民投票批准或否决的一种公投类型。其功能在于为既定决策提供最终的民意合法性确认，而非由公投本身产生政策选项。

[18] 放弃式公投（abdicatory referendum）指代议制机构（如议会）将一项重大政治决策的实质内容完全移交给选民，自身不事先就该议题进行实质性辩论、也不制定具体的执行方案，而由公投直接产生一个原则性方向（如“是否脱欧”）的公投类型。政治史学者罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）在分析2016年英国脱欧公投时，以此术语与“确认性公投”（confirmatory referendum）形成对照：在后者中，议会先通过立法形成具体方案，公投仅起最终批准或否决的确认功能；而在前者中，议会放弃了自身的审议与决策职责，导致公投结果缺乏后续执行的法律与政策框架。桑德斯指出，这种结构造成“脱欧授权”清晰，但“如何脱欧”的所有具体问题（如关税同盟、单一市场、北爱尔兰边境安排）均无权威决策主体，而传统上应由议会回答这些问题，但多数议员恰恰在自己的选区输掉了公投，其决策正当性受到削弱。因此，放弃式公投不仅改变了公投在宪政体系中的常规角色，更可能引发主权归属与治理权威的宪政危机，英国脱欧进程中的议会停摆、司法挑战等冲突正是这一后果的体现。

[19] 2016年7月11日，特蕾莎·梅在伯明翰启动竞选保守党领袖的活动中，首次说出了这句话：“Brexit means Brexit and we’re going to make a success of it.”（脱欧就是脱欧，我们要把它办好。）

[20] 指梅政府与欧盟历经近两年谈判后于2018年11月达成的《脱欧协议》（Withdrawal Agreement）及《未来关系政治宣言》。该协议包含599页的“脱离条款”和26页的“政治宣言”两部分。协议在保护欧盟公民权益、390亿英镑“分手费”、至2020年底的脱欧过渡期、北爱尔兰“后备安排”（backstop）等问题上做出了具体安排。然而，协议在英国议会遭遇了史无前例的三次否决：2019年1月15日首次表决以202票赞成、432票反对被否决，差距高达230票，是英国现代政治史上政府遭受的最大规模议会败绩；2019年3月12日第二次表决以242票赞成、391票反对被否决；2019年3月29日第三次表决以286票赞成、344票反对再次被否决。三次失败后，梅于2019年5月24日宣布辞去保守党党魁职务。

[21] 指约翰逊于2019年7月接任首相后，与欧盟重新谈判达成的新版脱欧协议。该协议于2019年10月17日与欧盟达成，核心变化是移除了备受争议的北爱尔兰“后备安排”，代之以修订后的北爱尔兰议定书。2019年10月22日，英国议会下院以329票赞成、299票反对通过了该协议的第一阶段（脱欧协议法案的“二读”投票）。2019年12月20日，议会下院正式通过约翰逊提出的脱欧法案，规定英国于2020年1月31日脱离欧盟。2020年1月22日，英国议会最终为约翰逊的脱欧协议“开放绿灯”。此后，2020年12月30日，议会下院又以521票赞成、73票反对的压倒性多数通过了英欧贸易与合作协议，为英国正式脱离欧盟完成最后的法律程序。

[22] “无协议脱欧”（No-deal Brexit） ：指英国在未与欧盟达成《脱欧协议》且未就未来关系达成框架协议的情况下退出欧盟。这意味着英国将立即退出欧盟单一市场和关税同盟，英欧贸易将退回到世界贸易组织（WTO）规则框架下运行，“脱欧”后亦不存在过渡期。英国政府内部代号为“黄鵐行动”（Operation Yellowhammer）的评估报告警告，无协议脱欧可能导致新鲜食品、燃料和药品短缺，公共秩序受扰，机场出入境延迟，北爱尔兰与爱尔兰之间可能恢复“硬边界”。无协议脱欧因此常被描述为“断崖式”（cliff-edge）变化。在议会2019年3月27日举行的首轮“指示性投票”（indicative votes）中，“无协议脱欧”方案亦未获得多数议员支持。

[23] 脱欧阵营的“分裂” 指支持脱欧的政治力量在“如何脱欧”的具体方案上缺乏共识。梅的脱欧协议之所以三次被议会否决，原因之一便是脱欧阵营内部的分裂——强硬脱欧派认为协议将英国永久束缚于欧盟规则（即“名义上的脱欧”，BRINO）；“软脱欧”支持者则认为可以争取与欧盟保持更紧密关系的安排；此外还有支持二次公投的议员试图借否决协议逆转脱欧结果。2019年3月27日和4月1日，英国议会先后举行两轮“指示性投票”，对包括“无协议脱欧”、“留在欧盟关税同盟”、“共同市场2.0”、“举行第二次公投”等在内的多个脱欧方案进行表决。结果八个方案在第一轮中全部被否决，无一获得多数支持；第二轮中四个方案同样未获通过。这一系列投票结果充分印证了脱欧阵营在具体脱欧路径上的深刻分裂——正如桑德斯所言，公投产生了“脱欧”的授权，却未产生关于“如何脱欧”的授权。

[24] 先知式民主（prophetic democracy） 是历史学家罗伯特·桑德斯（Robert Saunders）在分析英国脱欧后政治僵局时提出的一个概念。它指这样一种政治现象：政治 actors 如同《旧约》中的先知一样，宣称自己垄断了对“人民意志”的解释权，并以此为依据否定任何不符合其解读的政治方案为“违背民意”。

[25] despatch box（亦作 dispatch box）在英国议会语境中特指下议院议事厅中央长桌两侧放置的木制箱子，执政党前座议员（内阁大臣）与反对党前座议员（影子内阁成员）须站在各自一侧的箱子前发表演说。该箱原用于将法案文件携带入议事厅，现主要用于存放议员宣誓时所依据的圣经等宗教文本。在英国政治话语中，“从发言箱发言”（from the despatch box）或“站在发言箱前”（at the despatch box）特指内阁大臣或影子内阁成员在议会履行其核心职责——即代表本党阐述政策、回应质询、参与辩论。现存的发言箱系新西兰在二战后下议院重建时赠送的礼物。¹

[26] BBC Parliament（BBC国会台）是英国广播公司（BBC）旗下的一个免费公共电视（free-to-air）频道。它是英国唯一一个专注于政治事务的频道，其核心职责是直播和录播英国及地方各级立法机构的会议与辩论实况。

[27] 后座议员（backbenchers）指在英国议会下院中不担任政府大臣、影子内阁大臣或党鞭等前座职务的普通议员。他们坐在议事厅的后排座位（因而得名），其核心职责包括代表选区选民利益、参与立法审议、监督政府工作等。后座议员若严重违抗所属政党的投票指示（即“反叛”），可能面临被开除党籍等后果。

[28] agency（能动性／行动者属性）在政治理论中指行动者（agent）使事物发生改变的能力或属性（the property or capacity of actors to make things happen）。政治活动由行动者（agents）执行，其能动性内在于他们产生政治效果的权力之中。

[29] 悬浮议会指在大选后，没有任何一个政党赢得下议院过半数席位（即超过全部650席的一半，达到326席）的局面。在此情况下，执政党无法单凭自身力量在议会通过立法，须依赖其他政党的支持。在英国，悬浮议会又称“无绝对多数议会”或“无多数议会”。

[30] “Tribal”原意为“部落的”，在政治语境中常被用来形容一种强烈的群体认同和阵营忠诚。所谓“政治部落主义”（political tribalism），指政治行动者将自身所属的政党、意识形态或社会群体视为核心身份，并倾向于将其他阵营视为对立者，而非作为可以协商的政治伙伴。
在英国政治语境中，“tribal”通常带有批评意味，用于指责政党过度强调自身阵营利益、党派身份和内部团结，而削弱了跨党派合作、妥协以及寻求共同解决方案的能力。它区别于正常意义上的政党竞争：政党竞争承认不同政治利益之间的分歧，而政治部落主义则可能将政治冲突转化为身份对抗，使妥协被视为背叛。
在英国脱欧危机中，“tribal”主要指 Theresa May 与 Jeremy Corbyn 领导下的保守党与工党均倾向于按照传统党派立场处理脱欧问题。梅试图维持保守党的统一，却难以突破党内脱欧派与留欧派之间的矛盾；科尔宾则更多从工党传统立场出发，强调经济与社会议题，而未能形成广泛跨党派的脱欧解决方案。因此，英国脱欧危机中的政治僵局不仅源于政策分歧，也与政党体系缺乏跨阵营协商能力有关。

[31] “Whip”是英国议会政治中的一个重要制度术语，指政党负责议会事务协调的官员，即“党鞭”。党鞭的主要职责包括传达党的投票立场、统计议员支持情况、确保议员按照党方针参与表决，并协调政府在议会中的支持基础。
“Whipping”则指党鞭进行政治协调和纪律管理的过程。在英国议会中，党鞭会发布所谓的“党鞭通知”（whip），告知议员某项议案的重要程度以及政党的正式立场。对于政府而言，维持有效的党鞭体系对于确保议会多数、通过政府法案至关重要。严重违反党鞭指示可能导致议员被取消党籍、失去党内职务或遭受其他政治后果。在脱欧危机中，党鞭制度面临巨大压力。由于保守党和工党内部均存在严重分裂，党魁和党鞭难以同时维持党内团结与议会多数。议员在脱欧问题上的投票往往跨越传统党派界限，使得政府难以像正常情况下那样依靠党鞭体系组织稳定多数。

[32] 原文是party loyalties，而不是party royalties。语音识别把 loyalties 识别成 royalties 非常常见，因为两者发音接近（/ˈlɔɪəl.tiz/ vs /ˈrɔɪəl.tiz/），尤其在播客自动转写里很容易发生。

[33] 2016年英国脱欧公投后，工党内部因科尔宾在留欧宣传中“努力不足”而爆发大规模内讧。影子内阁中12名成员相继辞职，随后又有5名影子次长辞职，以表达对科尔宾领导的不满。资深后座议员玛格丽特·霍奇女爵士（Dame Margaret Hodge）向工党党团主席提出不信任动议，并得到另外八名工党议员的支持，要求科尔宾辞职。该动议虽无宪法约束力，但标志着工党内部反对科尔宾力量的公开摊牌。与此同时，工党副党魁沃森（Tom Watson）也向科尔宾表示，他在工党议员中已失去“权威”，其领导地位将面临正式挑战。面对危机，科尔宾拒绝辞职，声称自己不会“背叛”选举他出任党魁的工党成员，并宣布将在可能举行的新领导人选举中再次参选。最终，科尔宾在2016年夏天的党魁选举中以更大优势击败挑战者欧文·史密斯（Owen Smith），成功连任。

[34] 2017年6月大选中，特蕾莎·梅“豪赌”提前大选，结果保守党失去议会绝对多数席位，被迫与北爱尔兰民主统一党组建悬浮议会。大选失利后，保守党内部迅速掀起“倒梅”浪潮。民调显示49%的选民希望特蕾莎·梅辞职；约30名保守党下院议员酝酿对其领导权发起挑战。外交大臣鲍里斯·约翰逊被媒体披露为呼声最高的继任者人选，支持率达26%，五名内阁大臣据报曾联系约翰逊支持其“推翻”特蕾莎·梅。然而约翰逊公开表态无意逼宫。2018年12月，因脱欧协议遭议会强烈反对，48名保守党议员向保守党管理委员会提交不信任信，触发了对特蕾莎·梅的党内不信任投票。她最终以200票对117票的结果惊险过关。根据党内规则，此次胜利确保她在12个月内不会再面临党内领导权挑战。然而到2019年，随着脱欧协议三次被议会否决以及地方选举惨败，压力再度积聚；特蕾莎·梅最终于2019年5月宣布辞职，同年7月鲍里斯·约翰逊在党内成员投票中以压倒性优势当选新党魁并入主唐宁街。

[35] “Blue-chip seats”并非正式的选举制度术语，而是英国政治评论中常用的非正式表达，借用了金融市场中“蓝筹股”（blue-chip stocks）的含义，指那些长期以来具有高度稳定性、政治风险较低、被某一政党视为可靠资产的选区。
在英国政治语境中，该词尤其常用于描述保守党的传统优势选区（safe Conservative seats），这些选区通常位于英格兰南部和“中部英格兰”（Middle England）的富裕郊区，例如萨里（Surrey）、苏塞克斯（Sussex）、汉普郡（Hampshire）等地区。由于这些地区长期支持保守党，拥有较高收入水平、较强私有财产权意识以及传统中产阶级基础，因此被认为是保守党选举联盟的重要组成部分。

[36] “以就业为中心的脱欧”（jobs-first Brexit / Brexit for jobs） 是工党在2017年英国大选中提出的核心竞选口号，旨在将保护就业、提升经济与生活水平置于脱欧谈判的首位。2017年4月，时任首相特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）宣布提前举行大选。工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾（Jeremy Corbyn）于2017年5月9日在曼彻斯特正式启动竞选活动时，首次提出“以就业为先的脱欧”（jobs-first Brexit）这一承诺。随后在5月16日于布拉德福德发布的工党2017年竞选宣言《为了多数人，而非少数人》（For the many, not the few）中，这一口号被正式写入纲领。

[37] “红白蓝的脱欧”（red, white and blue Brexit） 是时任英国首相特蕾莎·梅（Theresa May）在2016年12月提出的政治口号，旨在用爱国主义修辞替代此前模糊的“脱欧就是脱欧”（Brexit means Brexit）表述。在2017年大选中，保守党以“红白蓝的脱欧”和“强大而稳定”（strong and stable）为核心竞选口号，但最终丧失了议会多数席位。竞选后保守党内部审查承认，该党缺乏清晰的政策信息，口号式的宣传不足以支撑长达七周的竞选周期。

[38] 红墙（Red Wall） 是英国政治术语，用于描述英格兰中部（Midlands）、约克郡（Yorkshire）及北部（Northern England）地区在历史上长期支持工党（Labour Party）的一系列议会选区。该术语由民意调查专家詹姆斯·卡纳加苏里亚姆（James Kanagasooriam）于2019年创造。

[39] 《一封加入英国治理的邀请信》（An Invitation to Join the Government of Britain） 是英国保守党在2010年大选中发布的竞选宣言（general election manifesto）。该宣言于2010年4月13日由时任保守党领袖戴维·卡梅伦（David Cameron）在伦敦南部巴特西发电站（Battersea Power Station） 正式发布。宣言发布之时，正值英国政坛深受2009年议员开支丑闻（MPs expenses scandal） 冲击之际，公众对职业政治家的信任降至低点。保守党希望通过这一“赋权于民”的纲领回应选民对政治体制的不满。

[40] 公投锁（referendum lock） 是英国政治中的一个专有名词，特指由 《2011年欧盟法案》（European Union Act 2011） 所确立的一项法律规定。该法案由卡梅伦领导的联合政府推动，于2011年7月19日获得御准（Royal Assent），其核心条款在同年8月19日正式生效。
“公投锁”的核心机制是：英国政府若要同意任何向欧盟转移权力或权限（competences）的条约变更，在法律上有义务必须先举行全民公投。该法案旨在兑现联合政府“确保在本届议会任期内不再向欧盟转移主权或权力”的承诺。只有在政府判定某项权力转移“不重大”（not significant）时，部长才有权决定不举行公投，但此决定必须在条约变更后两个月内做出，并可能面临司法复核（judicial review）。

[41] “Buccaneering”原指17世纪加勒比海地区的“海盗”（buccaneers）活动，后来逐渐引申为一种具有冒险主义、进取精神和反传统色彩的行为方式。在英国政治和经济语境中，该词常被用来形容一种大胆、自信、敢于突破既有规则限制的行动风格。

[42] “Euroscepticism”（疑欧主义、欧洲怀疑主义）指对欧洲一体化进程、欧盟制度或欧盟权力扩张持怀疑、批评甚至反对态度的政治立场。这里的“Euro-”指欧洲（尤其是欧洲联盟），而“scepticism”意为怀疑，并不必然意味着完全反对欧洲合作。在英国政治语境中，疑欧派通常主张限制欧盟对英国政治、经济和法律事务的影响，强调国家主权、议会主权以及民主问责。他们批评欧洲一体化导致权力从英国议会转移至欧盟机构，认为欧盟的规则制定过程距离普通选民过远，削弱了英国人民对自身事务的控制能力。

[43] 华盛顿共识（Washington Consensus） 指一套以新自由主义（neoliberalism）为理论基础的经济政策主张，主要由国际货币基金组织（IMF）、世界银行（World Bank） 及美国财政部等位于华盛顿的机构共同倡导。它强调减少政府干预、发挥市场主导作用，以此作为指导发展中国家经济改革和应对危机的标准方案。

[44] “WestEnders”是一个临时创造的幽默说法，并非真实存在的电视剧名称。它是对英国长寿肥皂剧《EastEnders》的戏仿。《EastEnders》是英国广播公司（BBC）制作的经典肥皂剧，故事背景设定在伦敦东区（East End），长期以家庭纠纷、人际冲突等连续剧式情节著称。
Ruth Fox 将 Mark D’Arcy 所说的“soap opera”（肥皂剧）改称为“WestEnders”，是一个双关笑话：她把《EastEnders》中的“East”（东区）替换为“West”（西区），指向伦敦威斯敏斯特（Westminster）的英国议会政治。由于脱欧危机期间英国政坛经历了首相更替、党内分裂、议会僵局以及反复投票等一系列戏剧性事件，评论者常将其比作一场持续上演的政治肥皂剧。
因此，“WestEnders”意指“威斯敏斯特版《东区人》”，即发生在英国议会和政治精英圈中的连续剧式政治闹剧。

[45] 改革党（Reform UK）是英国的一个右翼民粹主义政党，前身为“脱欧党”（Brexit Party），由奈杰尔·法拉奇（Nigel Farage）领导。该党主张强硬移民管控、“夺回英国控制权”等纲领。在2026年5月英国地方选举中，改革党取得历史性突破，赢得约1,454个地方议席，得票率约27%，超越保守党成为地方选举中的第二大党。该党在下议院仅有少数议员（当时约5名），被桑德斯形容为“议会外政党”。

[46] As all of us do字面意思是“我们大家都一样地（听欧洲关系委员会的会议）”，但在实际使用中常用于夸张地表示认同，尤其当说话者认为某件事实际上并不是大多数人都会做时，带有幽默或自嘲意味。其作用类似于中文中的“那当然，谁不是呢”“当然啦，大家都会这样嘛”，具体含义需要结合语境判断。这里译者做了一点转译。

[47] 法定文书（Statutory Instruments, SIs）是英国的一种次级立法（secondary legislation）形式，由政府部门根据议会通过的主法案（primary legislation）所授予的权力制定。SIs用于细化法律的具体实施细则，无需经过完整的议会立法程序（三读等），通常只需简单投票即可通过。批评者认为，SIs机制使行政部门获得了过多未经充分议会审查的立法权——这正是脱欧期间及之后议会审查欧盟相关法律时面临的突出问题。

[48] 政治传播中，“hook”指一个抽象议题能够连接公众经验、引发情感反应的具体问题或象征性议题。Saunders 在此处指的是：欧盟法规、制度权限等“主权”问题本身较为抽象，而移民则提供了一个普通选民能够直接感知的政治入口，使“民主控制权”的争论获得了具体对象。

[49] 国防投资计划（DIP）是英国政府制定的未来数年国防开支蓝图。该计划历经数月延迟，最终于2026年6月30日公布。计划确认在2026-27至2029-30四个财年追加150亿英镑国防开支，使未来四年国防总投资达到2980亿英镑。从2027-28财年起，英国将把GDP的2.7%用于北约“核心国防”开支，成为北约第三大现金支出国（仅次于美国和德国）。政府还承诺在下一届议会任期内将国防开支提高到GDP的3%，并按照北约盟国共识在2035年前达到3.5%。希利认为该计划金额“远低于”国防所需，并批评资金安排存在“后置”问题——即大部分资金安排在后期，而作战压力和战备需求集中在头两年。

[50] “啤酒门”（Beergate）是指2021年4月30日，时任工党领袖基尔·斯塔默在英格兰达勒姆郡（County Durham）参加地方选举竞选活动时，与工作人员在办公室内饮用啤酒的行为。当时英国正处于新冠疫情封锁期间，政府规定禁止不同家庭成员在室内聚集。斯塔默因此被警方调查，但最终未遭罚款。此事成为保守党攻击斯塔默“虚伪”的把柄——因其曾多次批评首相鲍里斯·约翰逊在唐宁街违反防疫规定举办派对（即“派对门”Partygate事件）。

[51] 梅克菲尔德（Makerfield）是位于大曼彻斯特地区的一个英国议会下院选区。2026年6月18日，该选区因原工党议员乔希·西蒙斯（Josh Simons）辞职而举行补选。大曼彻斯特市长安迪·伯纳姆（Andy Burnham）代表工党参选并获胜，得票率54.8%，远超改革党候选人罗伯特·肯扬的34.5%。此次补选被视为对斯塔默首相地位的关键考验，因为伯纳姆胜选后便具备了挑战工党党魁的资格。

[52] coronation在英国政治语境中是一个非正式术语，指政党在更换领导人时不经过竞争性选举程序，而是通过党内协商一致，让唯一候选人“自动”继任的做法。其对立面是contest，即多名候选人角逐党魁职位、由党员投票决定。在斯塔默面临挑战的语境下，工党议员可能倾向于通过coronation的方式让伯纳姆接任，以避免长达数周的党内竞选对国家治理造成的不确定性。

[53] 根据工党现行规则，若党魁职位出现空缺或获得20%以上工党议员（即约81名议员）提名支持挑战者，将触发正式的领导权竞选。竞选由工党党员及附属工会成员投票决定。批评者（如桑德斯）认为，这一制度意味着“谁当首相”的决定权掌握在一群未经选举产生、也无需向公众负责的人手中。在当前斯塔默面临挑战的语境下，这意味着首相可能被迫暂停治理国家、转而向党内成员争取支持。议员们可能倾向于绕过正式程序，通过“加冕”（coronation）方式——即让现任者自愿辞职、由唯一候选人直接接任——来避免漫长而分裂的竞选过程。

[54] 2025年6月在海牙举行的北约峰会上，英国及其他盟国承诺到2035年将GDP的5%用于国防和安全，其中3.5%用于符合北约标准的“核心国防”开支。2026年7月，北约峰会在土耳其举行，斯塔默首相此前将其设为公布国防投资计划的公开截止日期。由于国防开支问题引发的内阁动荡发生在峰会前夕，加剧了英国政府面临的外交压力。

[55] a cup that I think a lot of people would like to pass from them，这里的 cup 并非字面意义上的“杯子”，而是将一项职位、责任或棘手任务比作一个需要被“传递”的杯子。表达借用了英语中“pass the cup” 一类的隐喻性说法，并与“poisoned chalice”（毒酒杯）的政治隐喻相近：某个职位或任务表面上具有吸引力，实际上却伴随着巨大的压力、风险和责任，因此人们宁愿把它交给别人。

[56] 《大魔域》（The NeverEnding Story，1984）是一部经典奇幻电影，改编自迈克尔·恩德（Michael Ende）的同名小说。影片中，“虚无”（The Nothing）是一种不断吞噬幻想王国（Fantasia）的神秘力量，象征着绝望、失去信念和创造力的消亡。桑德斯以此比喻一种正在消耗英国政治活力的消极力量——重大决策必须做出，但政治系统似乎陷入了停滞和观望。

[57] 此处是对美国加州选举计票过程的幽默调侃。美国加州由于人口众多、邮寄选票比例高以及选举规则复杂，在一些竞争激烈的选举中经常需要较长时间完成计票和确认结果，因此常被英国媒体戏称为“迟迟数不完票”的地方。